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The Irony of International Business Law: 
U.S. Progressivism and China's 
New Laissez-Faire 
Andrew Brady Spalding 
ABSTRACT 
As the financial crisis draws U.S. business overseas and developing countries rise in influence, 
the regulation of international business has never figured so prominendy in federal law. 
But the dominant paradigm through which academics and policymakers continue to 
view that law-the so-called Washington Consensus-proves deeply misleading. A more 
accurate account of the components, origins, and aims of U.S. international business law 
reveals two striking ironies. 
First, in discrete but critical ways, the United States no longer represents the comparatively 
laissez-faire approach to federal business regulation. Rather, owing to its origins in the 
Progressive Era, U.S. federal law directs corporations toward noneconomic social goals, 
particularly combating corruption (for example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) and 
promoting human rights (for example, the Alien Tort Statute or economic sanctions). By 
contrast, the alternative legal regime to which the United States is frequendy compared-
China-largely allows companies to pursue profits internationally without regard to their 
impact on corruption and human rights. Though it remains true that the U.S. regime 
and its principal alternative are distinguished by the extent to which the state restricts 
business conduct to achieve social goals, the roles are now reversed. 
Second, the rise of an alternative model now substantially thwarts the goals of U.S. 
progressive regulation. Empirical research in political science and economics demonstrates 
that because the U.S. regime increases the costs of doing business in emerging markets, 
U.S. companies tend to invest less. The resulting void in capital is filled by companies 
from China and other countries that similarly lack prohibitions on bribery and human 
rights violations. Ironically, enforcement ofU.S. progressivism creates the very conditions 
in which corruption and human rights violations occur. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part 
of the country does not entertain. 
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
dissenting in Lochner v. New York1 
It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches 
mice. 
-Deng Xiaoping, former leader of the People's Republic 
of China, on market reforms2 
While Justice Holmes was crafting his famous Lochner dissent,3 the United 
States was in the midst of an intellectual and political movement that would 
confirm his observation and refashion federal law. Academics and policymakers 
of the Progressive Era4 repudiated the laissez-faire doctrine of commercial reg-
ulation and expanded federal power to combat corruption, promote democracy 
and human rights, and mitigate economic inequalities.5 International business 
law was at first largely untouched by this movement, principally because 
business was then overwhelmingly domestic. But as U.S. business has expanded 
overseas and into emerging markets,6 U.S. law has ineluctably followed, seeking 
to conform conduct in those countries to (some of) the same domestic 
standards.7 However, our understanding of the paradigm of U.S. international 
1. 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Hohnes,J., dissenting). 
2. Johanna McGeary, Deng Xiaoping Set Off Seismic Changes in China, TIME, Mar. 3, 1997, at 6, 
available at http:/ /www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171, 985990-6,00.html. 
3. For recent commentary on the enduring impact of Justice Hohnes's dissent on federal regulation, 
see, for example, Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale if Two Lochners: The Untold History if Substantive 
Due Process and the Idea if Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751 (2009); Miguel Schor, 
The Strange Cases ifMarbury and Lochner in the Constitutional Imagination, 87 TEx. L. REV. 
1463 (2009). 
4. For the influence of the Progressive Era on contemporary law and academic commentary, see, 
for example, Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement if Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 743 (2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Progressive Visionary: Stephen Reinhardt and the First 
Amendment, 120 YALE L.J. 515 (2010); Edward]. McCafferey & James R Hines, Jr., The Last 
Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031 (2010). 
5. See infra Part I.B. 
6. See Neil Hodge, Is the Sun Beginning to Shine on Emerging Markets?, INT'L B. NEWS, Feb. 2009, 
at22. 
7. See, e.g., KURT MOORE, THE ORIGINS OF GLOBALIZATION (2009). 
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business law-its components, origins, and aims-remains a blur of confusion 
and misperception among academics and enforcement officials alike. 
We are therefore unable to grasp, and much less remedy, the adverse and 
ironic effects of U.S. business law enforcement in the developing world. U.S. 
legal scholars continue to debate individual components of the U.S. interna-
tional business law regime such as the Alien Tort Statute8 (ATS) or the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).9 But we have not meaningfully engaged the 
questions of how these components combine to form a paradigm or how that 
paradigm operates in developing countries. Meanwhile, another vein of legal 
literature rigorously compares the "legal origins" of various nations' domestic 
legal regimes to understand whether they promote economic growth.10 While 
this literature is comparative, it is not international and does not consider how 
the international business law regimes of powerful nations impact the legal and 
economic growth of developing nations. The legal academy has thus by default 
left that question to scholars from other disciplines;11 we should not be surprised 
by the resulting omissions. 
This Article seeks, for the first time in the legal academic literature, to 
identify and define the actual U.S. paradigm of international business law, and 
then to compare it more accurately to the alternative that China now represents. 
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, 
Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance ifErie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 
(2007); Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense if the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 
(2011); Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth From Reality About Corporate Responsibility 
Litigation, 7]. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 274 (2004);Julian Ku &John Yoo, Beyond Formalism 
in Foreign A.ffoirs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 15 3. 
9. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codilied as amended 
at 15 U.S. C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(l), (g}-(h), 78dd(1}-(3), 78ff (2006)), amended by Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codilied as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1}-(3), 78fl); International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codilied as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78dd(1}-(3), 78fl). 
10. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, F1orencio Lopez-de-Silanes &Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences 
if Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008); Rafael La Porta, F1orencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); 
Rafael La Porta, F1orencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal 
Determinants if External Finance, 52]. FIN. 1131 (1997); Mark). Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and 
Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006). 
11. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, The Fafade if FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. ]. INT'L L. 907 (2010); 
Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic 
Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351 (2010); Amy Deen Westbrook, 
Enthusiastic Eriforcement, Irifonnal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion if the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 45 GA. L. REv. 489 (2011). 
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While it certainly remains true, as the literature posits, that the U.S. and 
Chinese regimes of international business law are distinguishable by the extent 
to which the state limits economic freedom to advance social goals, I argue 
that the roles are in fact reversed. The U.S. regime, with roots traceable to the 
Progressive Era, uses the coercive power of the federal state to compel corpora-
tions toward social ends that are not narrowly related to market efficiency and 
economic growth. By contrast, following the death of Mao Zedong and the rise 
of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, China instituted a series of market 
reforms to promote growth and forestall social discontent, 12 without imposing 
comparable obligations on corporations to promote progressive values in their 
extraterritorial conductY Accordingly, in a dramatic and yet unrecognized irony 
of international business law, the United States, in discrete but important 
respects, now represents the heavier hand of government regulation, while com-
munist China has become comparatively laissez-faire. Indeed, the contrasting 
regimes and their contest for influence in the developing world regrettably 
resemble a peculiar sort of postmodern, turned-on-its-head cold war:14 China, 
communist in name but no longer in fact, increasingly represents value-free 
profit-seeking to the developing world, while the United States, once the self-
styled beacon of free market economics, knowingly curtails corporate profit-
seeking to promote greater public good and increasingly asks other countries 
to do the same. 
The contrast between the United States and China, properly understood, 
proves even more deeply ironic for their impact in developing countries. 
Drawing on empirical research in economics and political science, this Article 
shows that because U.S. progressivism significandy increases the costs of investing 
in developing countries, it tends to cause a decrease in such investment.15 This 
effect is at times by design (for example, economic sanctions for human rights 
abuses), but at others by accident (for example, the FCPA). In striking 
contrast, Chinese companies do not incur these added costs because their legal 
regime does not impose penalties on the methods of doing business that U.S. 
12. See infra Part liLA. 
13. See infra Part III.B. 
14. While some literature analogizes contemporary U.S.-China relations to U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations 
of the Cold War, it generally presumes the conventional democracy/communism distinction. See, 
e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The United States and Human Rights Treaties: Race Relations, the Cold War, 
and Constitutionalism, 9 CHINESE]. INT'L L. 321 (2010); Rein Milllerson, Promoting Democracy 
Without Starting aNew Cold War?, 7 CHINESE]. lNT'L L.l (2008). 
15. See infra Part IV.B. 
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progressivism proscribes.16 As U.S. enforcement increases and companies invest 
less than they otherwise would, the unmet capital need in developing countries 
becomes a void that Chinese companies fill. And those companies are able to 
conduct business without fear of violating laws concerning corruption and 
human rights. The U.S. enforcement of norms against corruption and human 
rights violations thus creates the very conditions in which those practices thrive. 
The cost is thus born by the developing countries whose prospects for legal, 
social, and economic growth are otherwise highly promising. 
Part I of this Article explains the dominant paradigm through which 
academics understand the U.S. model of regulating business conduct-the 
'Washington Consensus." This paradigm holds that federal law governing 
commercial activity is defined chiefly, if not exclusively, by the neoliberal com-
mitment to market deregulation. 17 It includes such policy prescriptions as 
privatization through reducing government ownership and regulation, remov-
ing constraints on trade, allowing interest rates to respond more directly to market 
conditions, reducing government subsidies, and removing obstacles to foreign 
direct investment. The theme among these prescriptions is, of course, reducing 
the role oflaw and government in commerce; they suggest that the United States 
stands for less government regulation of business vis-a-vis other legal systems, 
and not more. Although the Washington Consensus paradigm is indeed 
accurate in describing principles of industrial and financial regulation, it does 
not incorporate the body of federal law that specifically applies to extraterritorial 
business conduct. Academics, even in the legal academy, nonetheless continue 
to view U.S. commercial regulation through the Washington Consensus lens, as 
through a glass, darkly. 
Part ll seeks to define more accurately the U.S. paradigm of extraterritorial 
business law. It illustrates how the principles of the Progressive Era explain the 
areas of federal law with which U.S. companies principally contend: The FCPN8 
seeks to reduce corporate corruption in international business; democracy 
and human rights are variously promoted through economic sanctions,l9 the 
16. See infra Part IV.B. 
17. See, e.g., Ross P. Buckley, The Economic Policies qf China and India, and qf the Washington 
Consensus: An Enlightening Comparison, 27 WIS. INT'L L.J. 707 (2010) (comparing the policies 
of China and India with Washington Consensus policies); Brian Langille, Imagining Post 
"Geneva Consensus" Labor Law for Post "Washington Consensus" Development, 31 COMP. LAB. L. 
& POL'¥}. 523 (2010); John Williamson, A Short History qf the Washington Consensus, 15 L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. 7 (2010) (giving a brief history of the term and its understanding today). 
18. See infta Part II .A. 
19. See ily'Ta Part II.B.2. 
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ATS/0 and the extraterritorial application of employment discrimination laws;21 
and provisions of the U.S. tax code that apply to extraterritorial corporate profits 
obligate corporations to fund the federal government and its myriad programs.22 
These principles, not the doctrine of laissez-faire capitalism, describe most 
accurately the legal regime that governs the overseas conduct ofU.S. business. 
Part III explains how the misunderstanding concerning the impact ofU.S. 
international business law in developing countries is only compounded by 
efforts to define the principal alternative to the U.S. model. That model is now 
represented by China, a country that is well capitalized, aggressive in its foreign 
policy and international business conduct, and governed by a very different legal 
regime. That regime, sometimes called the "Beijing Consensus"23-but more 
often described as "state capitalism"24 or the "socialist market economy"25-is 
generally viewed in implicit or explicit contrast to the U.S. model. This schol-
arship suggests that owing both to its communist past and its present fear of 
social unrest, China imposes significantly greater restrictions on individual 
freedoms in the political and economic spheres alike.26 The literature further 
details the appeal of China's alternative legal model to developing countries across 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa, particularly those that lack political accounta-
bilityY This contrast between the neoliberal Washington Consensus and 
socialist/authoritarian Beijing Consensus-which is becoming increasingly 
popular in academic and popular commentary alike28-is at best incomplete and 
at worst misleading. In fact, although the Chinese government owns, controls, 
and/or subsidizes most of its major multinational corporations, the governing 
legal regime does not have meaningful analogues to the FCP A, ATS, economic 
20. See i'!fra Part TI.B.l. 
21. See in.fra Part II.B.3. 
22. See in.fra Part II. C. 
23. See, e.g., STEFAN HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA'S AUTHORITARIAN 
MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE 21ST CENTURY (2010). 
24. Id. at 10; see also IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THEW AR 
BE1WEEN STATES AND CORPORATIONS? 134 (2010). 
25. YUQ!NG XING, NAT'L GRADUATE lNST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, CONSUMPTION, INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION, Al"'D STATE OWNERSHIP IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 11 (2010), 
available at httpl/r-center.grips.ac.jp/gallery/docs/10-18.pdf. 
26. See, e.g., HALPER, supra note 23; MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: 
THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER (2009). 
27. See, e.g., HALPER, supra note 23, at 39; JACQ!JES, supra note 26, at 321; Raymond W. Copson, 
US Response to China's Rise in A.frica: Policy and Policy Options, in AFRICA IN CHINA'S GLOBAL 
STRATEGY (Marcel Kitissou ed., 2007). 
28. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Power to the (Blogging) People, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/15/opinionllSfriedman.html. 
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sanctions for human rights abuses, or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 
More generally, the Chinese government does not expect Chinese corporations 
to advance social goals in their overseas conduct other than the preservation of 
social stability-and the Communist Party's hold on power-through otherwise 
value-neutral profit-seeking. Ultimately, in comparison to the progressive norms 
that define the U.S. regime of international business law, China is more 
accurately understood as substantially laissez-faire. 
Part IV draws on theoretical and empirical research in economics and 
political science to understand the impact of these competing legal regimes in 
developing countries. It first illustrates that progressive capitalism is enforced 
almost exclusively against developing nations. It then draws on two theories-
'constructive engagement" and the "black knight"-to show how the rise of 
China produces a perverse effect in international business whereby the 
enforcement ofU.S.laws too often creates the very conditions in which corrup-
tion and human rights abuses proliferate. In conclusion, this Article lays the 
groundwork for future empirical and theoretical research on how the United 
States might promote progressive values more effectively in developing countries. 
I. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW: RECONSIDERING 
THE DOMINANT PARADIGM 
This Part first describes the existing paradigm through which academics 
and policymakers generally understand the U.S. regime of international business 
law-the 'Washington Consensus"-and highlights the paradigm's limitations. 
This Part then explores the tension-which I will call a jurisdictional 
oxymoron-inherent in the notion of a U.S. regime of international business 
law, and proposes parameters for choosing those federal statutes that rightly 
belong in an analysis of that regime. After selecting the laws for inclusion, this 
Part shows that these laws have a common origin in the Progressive Era ofU.S. 
history and the intellectual movement that it spawned. 
A. The Misleading 'Washington Consensus" 
The prevailing view of U.S. international business law emerged in the 
1980s. After several decades in which the Keynes model of comparatively heavy 
economic regulation dominated post-World War II economic thinking, the 
29. See ilyra Part III.B. 
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world recession of the 1970s gave rise to a new model of economics generally 
and, specifically, to the theory ofWestern development economics known as the 
Washington Consensus.30 
The new model, promoted most famously by Milton Friedman, held 
that economic growth would increase only when markets could operate freely 
and efficiently, thus requiring deregulation, liberalization, and privatization.31 
More specifically, this meant deregulating markets, removing controls on 
investment, allowing interest and exchange rates to float in response to world 
markets, reducing public spending and government ownership of industry, 
and reducing subsidies.32 With the elections of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan, this model became the guiding philosophy of the leading Western 
liberal nations. This paradigm also came to dominate the agendas of the two 
leading global financial institutions, both of which were headquartered in 
Washington, D.C.: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Against this background, the term 'Washington Consensus" emerged 
in 1989 and included a number of points: imposing fiscal discipline; 
reforming taxation; liberalizing interest rates; securing property rights; pri-
vatizing state-run subsidies; deregulating markets; adopting a competitive 
exchange rate; removing barriers to trade; and removing barriers to foreign direct 
investment.33 Western lending agencies termed these reform packages "structural 
adjustment programs" (SAPs) and imposed them universally without regard to 
the recipient country's unique economic and legal conditions.34 Between 1980 
30. HALPER, supra note 23, at 51; see also Buckley, supra note 17 (comparing the policies of China 
and India with Washington Consensus policies as applied in the Americas and Africa); 
Williamson, supra note 17 (giving a brief history of the term and its understanding today). 
31. HALPER, supra note 23, at 54; see MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (40th 
Anniversary ed. 2002) (1962); Milton Friedman, The Hong Kong Experiment, HOOVER DIGEST, 
July 30, 1998, http://www.hoover.org/publicationslhoover-digest/article/7696 (stating that Hong 
Kong has made great strides in the past fifty years because of its laissez-faire market). 
32. HALPER, supra note 23, at 57. 
33. See NIALL FERGUSSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD 
308-09 (2008). 
34. HALPER, supra note 23, at 57. See generally Kwaku Owusu Afriyie, Do the Poor Develop the 
Rich? Taking a Second Look at Structural Adjustment Programmes (Dec. 2, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1284993 (discussing how structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) were introduced, what countries must go through to receive funding, and how 
SAPs, in general, have failed); Benzarour Choukri, Macroeconomic Policies for Structural Adjustment 
Policies (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 14980, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/ 
abstract=1398729 (analyzing and explaining the main provisions of SAPs); William Easterly, 
What Did Structural Adjustment Adjust? The Association of Policies and Growth With Repeated IMF 
and World Bank Adjustment Loans, 76 ]. ECON. DEV. 1 (2005) (examining the top twenty 
recipients of repeated SAP lending and their growth); Sebastian Edwards, Structural Adjustment 
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and 1995, approximately 80 percent of the world's population found itself on the 
receiving end of a SAP.35 
Discussions about international economics and the role of the United 
States vis-a -vis developing countries thus came to be predicated on a widely 
held assumption that the United States was fundamentally promoting laissez-
faire economics. Consider, however, the kinds of issues encompassed in this 
paradigm: They generally pertain to financial and trade regulations, both of 
which are narrowly economic in their focus. Absent from this paradigm, 
however, is much discussion of the legal obligations that the U.S. government 
imposed directly on U.S. businesses in their overseas conduct. The Washington 
Consensus encompassed the regulation of finance and trade, but not of business 
more generally. Throughout this period, business law nonetheless continued to 
be characterized to a very large extent by the federal laws that had emerged prior 
to the 1980s deregulation movement and had imposed substantial responsi-
bilities on U.S. businesses to promote social and political goals at the expense of 
profit.36 Although the recession of the 1970s and the deregulation movement 
of the 1980s would displace much of Keynesian economics, it would not displace 
the legacy of the Progressive Movement in international business. 
B. International Business Law: A Jurisdictional Oxymoron 
Despite its ever-increasing prominence in modern business practice, there 
is something faintly awkward in the U.S. context about the field of international 
business law. It proves a difficult concept to define. A casual perusal of a typical 
law school textbook in the field of International Business Transactions (IBT) 
reveals somewhat of a hodge-podge: a bit of contract law, some import/export 
controls, a little bit on the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, and 
so forth.37 I surely was not the first bright-eyed young business law student to 
Policies in Highly Indebted Countries (NBER Working Paper No. W2502, 1989), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract;425541 (analyzing highly indebted countries between 1982 and 1987 
and the type of adjustment received); Jason Morgan-Foster, Note, The Relationship of IMF 
Structural Atijustment Programs to Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Argentine Case 
Revisited, 24 MICH.]. INT'L L. 577, 578-83 (2003) (providing a short oveiView of SAPs and 
concluding that they do not improve growth). For a general look at conditions imposed under 
SAPs, see IMF Conditionality, lNT'L MONETARY FuND, Sept. 14, 2011, http://www.imf.org/ 
externaVnp/exr/facts/conditio.htm. 
35. HALPER, supra note 23, at 60. 
36. See infra Part II. 
37. See, e.g., DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS]. SCHOENBAUM, lNfERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2010); RALPH H. FOLSOM, 
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open his IBT textbook for the first time and feel discombobulated. This 
awkwardness is due, in very large part, to the peculiar jurisdictional scheme of 
U.S. federalism. In ratifYing the U.S. Constitution, the states sought to preserve 
their authority over domestic business, while creating a federal government with 
a more limited authority to regulate international conduct?8 Business law has, 
with a few historic exceptions such as the Exchange Act of 193439 or the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002,40 generally remained with the states, while interna-
tional matters are typically federal. 41 International business law, then, awkwardly 
falls somewhere in between. It is not quite fully federal, yet not quite within the 
province of the states. Where, then, does it come from, and what exactly is it? 
This Article does not propose a comprehensive redefinition of the field of 
international business law. However, it does propose that we momentarily set 
aside the inherited definitions of international business law and start from 
scratch, with a few criteria for selecting the areas of law to include in this study. 
First, laws in this study should be federal-and not state law. Only federal law 
reflects a national policy determination that a set oflegal obligations is rightfully 
imposed on businesses in their international conduct. Second, this Article 
focuses on laws that the United States enforces unconditionally in international 
business, irrespective of their effects on U.S. markets. These are laws that the 
MICHAEL W. GORDON & JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS, TRADE &ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2005). 
38. Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the United States: 
Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553,555-56 (1993) (examining the evolution of U.S. 
business law starting after the Revolutionary War); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and 
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1124 
(1986) (stating that the framers of the Constitution wanted to keep regulation of commerce with 
foreign nations in Congress to further national mercantilist policy, thus avoiding inconsistent 
state regulation). 
39. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2006). See generally Peter V. Letsou, 
The Changing Face of Corporate Governance Regulation in the United States: The Evolving Roles of 
the Federal and State Governments, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 149, 171 (2009) (identifying the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 as one of the few federal laws governing business). 
40. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; Letsou, supra note 39, at 185-
86 (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley, along with the Exchange Act of 1934, is one of the few 
federal laws governing business conduct). 
41. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR 
SECURITIES REGULATION 2 (2002) ("[I]t would be most descriptively accurate to say that 
federal securities law has occupied the securities field and that state law development has been 
marginal."); Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of Insurance: 
Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835, 837-40, 878 (2006) 
(describing how insurance is regulated by the individual states, but advocating for increased 
federal presence to deal with new insurance issues (for example, loss via terrorism)). 
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United States enforces because it believes that business should conduct itself 
internationally in conformance to these principles, irrespective of their impact on 
the U.S. economy; such are the truest examples of U.S. international business 
law. This excludes those areas of federal business law historically governed by the 
effects test in their extraterritorial application, such as securities42 and antitrust.43 
Third, this Article does not look at treaties, such as the World Trade 
Organization44 or the North American Free Trade Agreement;45 though unmis-
takably business-oriented and international in focus, they are compromises 
42. The Supreme Court has recendy held that the anti-fraud provision of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of1934 § 10(b) will no longer use a "conduct and effects" test. Morrison v. Nat'! Austl. Bank 
Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879-80 (2010). Rather, the Court has adopted a "transactional test" to 
determine whether jurisdiction is proper. Id.; see also Lapiner v. Camtek, Ltd., No. C 08-01327 
MMC, 2011 WL 445849, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2011) (applying Morrison, and finding 
jurisdiction where the plaintiff purchased stock on NASDAQ even though the stock purchase 
was made in Israel); In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327,336-
37 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (applying Morrison, and declining to exercise jurisdiction over a claim 
involving an American plaintiff who purchased securities on a foreign exchange even though the 
securities were also available on the NYSE); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 
627 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that there was no jurisdiction over a claim involving American 
investors who had purchased securities on the Swiss Exchange in light of Morrison). However, it 
is unclear whether Morrison will apply to cases brought by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) (instead of private individuals) or its impact on other sections of the 
Exchange Act. Steven M. Davidoff, How Porsche May Outmaneuver a Securities Suit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 22,2010, http:l/dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/22/how-porsche-may-outmaneuver-
a-securities-suit. 
43. See, e.g., Jordan A. Dresnick, Kimberley A. Piro & Israel J. Encinosa, The United States as Global 
Cop: Difining the 'Substantial Efficts' Test in U.S. Antitrust Enforcement in the Americas and Abroad, 
40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 453 (2009) (analyzing the evolution of the effects test law 
through major antitrust cases); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 
(1993) (holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act applies where defendants intend for their 
conduct to be felt in the United States and such effect occurs); United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus 
Chemical Co., 322 F.3d 942, 945-46 (7th Cir. 2003) (analyzing the effect of the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act on the Sherman Act's effects test); Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveaft! 
Sendirian Berhad, 299 F.3d 281, 295-96 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the substantial effects test 
is used to determine jurisdiction when conduct is primarily foreign). 
44. For an explanation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), including history, see What Is the 
WID?, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_elwhatis_elwhatis_e.htm (last visited Oct. 
17, 2011). For an in-depth analysis ofWTO cases for the previous two years, see Raj Bhala & 
David Gantz, WID Case &view 2009,27 ARIZ.}. INT'L &COMP. L. REV. 85 (2010); Raj Bhala 
& David A. Gantz, WID Case Review 2008, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L &COMP. L. REV. 113 (2009). 
45. For an explanation of the North American FreeT rade Agreement (NAFT A), including history, see 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S. DEF'T OF AGRIC., http://www.fas. 
usda.gov/itp/Policy/NAFTNnafta.asp (last updated June 30, 2011). For recent NAFTA 
activity, see Olivia Howe, Recent Developments in NAFTA Law-Spring Update 2010, 16 L. & 
BUS. REV. AM. 613 (2010); Olivia Howe, Recent Developments in NAFTA Law-Winter Update 
2009/2010, 16 L. &BUS. REV. AM. 361 (2010). 
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among nations and, as such, do not reflect the U.S.'s independent policy 
determinations about the proper role of federal law in regulating extrater-
ritorial business conduct. When focusing on international business law, thus 
defined, an unmistakable pattern emerges. 
C. Repudiating Laissez-F aire: The Progressive Era 
The various components of U.S. international business law, which I will 
detail below, reflect an approach to the federal regulation of business that is 
wholly unlike laissez-faire capitalism. Rather, it strikes one as a reaction against 
laissez-faire principles, and in fact, that is exactly what it was, and is. These 
laws find their origins in the Progressive Era, a historical period and an 
intellectual movement that began in the late nineteenth century in response to 
the laws and economic conditions of the Industrial Revolution.46 Although the 
concept of progressivism is alive and well in the legal academy today and is 
invoked in a dizzying array of fields and literatures,47 international business law 
has not traditionally been among them. This is somewhat ironic, given that the 
Progressive Movement emerged in part as a direct response to a most 
(in)famous legal case involving the federal regulation of business activity: 
Lochner v. New York. 48 
The plaintiff in Lochner had been convicted of violating a New York 
statute that made it a misdemeanor for bakeries to allow their employees to 
work more than sixty hours in a week or ten hours in one day. Justice Rufus 
Peckham, writing for the majority, reversed New York's high court and held 
that the state legislature exceeded its police powers and violated a broad 
46. See, e.g., RONALD]. PESTRITTO & WILLIAM J. AITO, AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM: A 
READER (2008) (providing a detailed history of American progressivism and its impact on the 
United States today); Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 993 (1990) (providing a history of the Progressive Era, starting in the industrial 
age, and its impact today). 
4 7. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, The Tramformation rf Originality in the Progressive-Era Debate Over 
Copyright in News, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 323 (2009) (suggesting that originality 
in copyright law has its roots in the Progressive Era); Eric R. Claeys, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy 
Legacy rf Progressivism in Zoning, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 733-36 (2004) (arguing that 
Progressive Era understanding of land use regulation law, specifically wning, does not adequately 
explain its use and importance today); Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism, 17 STAN. L. & 
POL'¥ REV. 197 (2006) (advocating a change in the government's role in markets using 
Progressive Era thinking); Brendan M. Brice, Comment, Plyer v. Doe: Progressivism and 
Undocumented Aliens, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP.]. 357, 400 (1999) (arguing a progressive approach 
towards undocumented aliens). 
48. 198 U.S. 45,47 (1905). 
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Fourteenth Amendment liberty of contract.49 Justice Holmes, in dissent, 
criticized the majority for deciding the case "upon an economic theory which a 
large part of the country does not entertain."50 That theory, of course, was 
laissez-faire economics.51 
A chorus of scholars joined Justice Holmes in criticizing the Court's 
decision and its underlying economic theory. Among the most prominent 
was Richard T. Ely, a political economist at the University of Wisconsin, 
Madison, who called the doctrine of laissez-faire economics a "complete 
fiasco"52 in practice that was "unsafe in politics and unsound in morals."53 He 
rejected the older ideas of Adam Smith and his negative conception of 
freedom and the state in favor of a positive conception of liberty, associated 
with John Stuart Mill, in which the powers of government are utilized to 
advance individual liberties and temper the harmful effects of economic 
inequalities.54 While the proponents of negative liberty sought to protect indi-
vidual freedoms by limiting the power of the state, the advocates of the new 
progressive, positive conception of freedom saw "positive state action as the 
key to reducing economic inequalities and thus to enhancing individual 
freedom."55 Other scholars of political economy who sounded similar themes 
and helped give rise to the movement were Henry Carter Adams at the 
University of Michigan and Henry Seagar and Edwin R.A. Seligman at 
Columbia University.56 
The Progressive Movement became a multifaceted push for reform, 
addressing a diverse array of social and economic issues at both the state and 
federal levels. But three themes unmistakably characterize both the Progressive 
Era and the contemporary U.S. regulation of international business. First was 
49. Id. at 50. 
50. Id. at 75. 
51. Although the nine Justices disagreed sharply on the scope of state power, "all nine justices understood 
individual liberty in negative terms and viewed social and economic legislation enacted under the 
police powers as an interference with and an infringement of that liberty." Steven M. Ingram, 
Taking Liberties With Lochner: The Supreme Court, Workmen's Compensation, and the Struggle to 
Difine Liberty in the Progressive Era, 82 OR. L. REV. 779, 781 (2003). 
52. RICHARDT. ELY, THE PAST AND THE PRESENTOFPOLITICALECONOMY(1884). 
53. RICHARDT. ELY, GROUND UNDER OUR FEET: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 132-44 (Amo Press 
1977) (1938). 
54. Richard T. Ely, Industrial Liberty, in PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
ASSOCIATION 59 (1902), reprinted in RICHARDT. ELY, STIJDIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF 
INDUSTRIAL SOCIE1Y 398-425 (1903). 
55. Ingram, supra note 51, at 793. 
56. Id. at 795-97. 
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a commitment to reducing corruption in business and government. The 
"muckrakers" -a term that Theodore Roosevelt coined to describe a new breed 
of journalists-exposed business and government corruption in the new 
national magazines, leading to a number of federal reforms. 57 One such series 
of articles criticized the monopoly of John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil 
Company and contributed meaningfully to the enforcement of antitrust laws.58 
In the same vein, a series of articles entitled 'The Treason of the Senate" exposed 
corruption in the U.S. Senate,59 contributing significantly to the ratification 
of the Seventeenth Amendment instituting the direct election of U.S. senators.60 
The Prohibition movement, which produced the Eighteenth Amendment,61 
similarly reflects the anticorruption impulse. 
A second theme was a commitment to promoting democracy and indi-
vidual rights, particularly the rights of women and the poor. In establishing the 
direct election of U.S. senators, supporters of the Seventeenth Amendment 
sought to curb the abuses of state-appointed senators and to make the office more 
democratically accountable.62 The Nineteenth Amendment granted women the 
57. See THE MUCKRAKERS: EVANGELICAL CRUSADERS (Robert Miraldi ed., 2000); Harry H. 
Stein, American Muckrakers and Muckraking: The 50-Year Scholarship, JOURNALISM Q, Spring 
1979, at 9-17. 
58. See IDA TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904) (giving a 
detailed explanation of the structure and creation of the Standard Oil Trust and the various illegal 
means it employed to control its monopoly). 
59. David Graham Philips, The Treason of the Senate: Aldrich, the Head of It All, COSMOPOLITAN 
MAG., Mar. 1906, http:/ /www.starkman.com/hippo/history/aldrich/phillips.htrnl. 
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see also JayS. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the 
Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 505-06 (1997) (evaluating the 
debates surrounding the passage of the amendment and discussing the impact of the direct election 
of senators today); Ralph A Rossurn, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Supreme 
Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671 (1999) (analyLing how the 
amendment impacted the states and, later, Supreme Court interpretation); Todd]. Zywicki, Beyond 
the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for 
Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 168, 184 (1997) (characterizing election of 
state legislators as corrupted, examining the political climate leading up to the amendment's passage, 
and offering explanations for its passage as well as its implications today). 
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII; see also RUTH DUPRE, THE PROHIBffiON OF ALCOHOL 
REVISITED: THE US CASE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2004), available at 
http://www.hec.ca/iealcahiers/2004/iea041l_rd.pdf, Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and 
the Emergence of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1 (2006) (taking a detailed look at the Supreme Court cases regarding Prohibition 
up until its repeal by the Twenty-FJISt Amendment). 
62. See Bybee, supra note 60, at 544 (stating that the Seventeenth Amendment was enacted, in part, 
so that senators would be responsible to the people); Zwyicki, supra note 60, at 184 (viewing the 
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment as a response to the "perceived inability of state 
legislatures to perform their electoral function"). 
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right to vote in federal elections.63 The concern with protecting the votes and 
political influence of the economically disadvantaged similarly motivated the 
push to establish the initiative, referendum, and recall at the state level. 64 
The Progressive Era has been rightly criticized for failing to address issues of 
racial or ethnic inequality--or, worse, reinforcing and exacerbating these 
inequalities.65 But, as with the Founding Era, the conflicts and hypocrisies that 
characterized certain of the Progressive Era's leading figures have not displaced 
the legacy of their better ideas. 
A third major development of the Progressive Era, one which applies most 
forcefully to corporations today in their extraterritorial activity and which 
reflects an intellectual repudiation of laissez-faire economics, is the estab-
lishment of federal income tax with the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. 
Called "the quintessential progressive reform,"66 the tax was not merely a means 
of increasing government revenue, but represented a revolt against the "classical 
nineteenth-century emphasis on negative individual liberties toward a more 
progressive and revitalized conception that stressed an active role for the posi-
tive state."67 It supplanted the conception of the state as a passive protector of 
private property and established "an active role for the positive state in the 
63. U.S. CON ST. amend. XIX; see also Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex 
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1045 (2002) (analyzing the 
suffrage debates leading up to the amendment's enactment and the history of the amendment 
since); Jennifer K. Brown, Note, The Nineteenth Amendment and Woman's Equality, 102 YALE 
L.]. 2175, 2204 (1993) (detailing the suffrage movement and affirming the amendment's purpose 
of recognizing women's constitutional equality). 
64. See John Dinan, The Original Intent and Current Operation if Direct Democratic Institutions, 70 
ALB. L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2007) (arguing that direct democracy has changed from the wants of 
the popular will to a vehicle for special interests); K.K. DuVivier, Out if the Bottle: The Genie 
if Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1045 (2007) (providing a brief history of direct democracy 
and a brief look at recent court decisions involving direct democracy); Nathaniel A. Persily, The 
Peculiar Geography o/ Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Riferendum, and Recall Developed in 
the American West, 2 MICH. L. &POL'¥ REV. 11, 40 (1997) (exploring the conditions that gave 
rise to direct democracy in the American West). 
65. See, e.g., Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection if Race and Gender in 
the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 45, 78 (1996) (describing the Progressive Era 
as "the heyday of racism," using the failure to pass antilynching legislation as an example); Michael 
J.l.<.hrrnan, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881,945 (1998) (concluding, 
afrer analyzing four Progressive Era Supreme Court cases, that the decisions had little impact on 
racial practices such as lynching, black disenfranchisement, etc.). 
66. JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM 
IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 187(}-1920, at 355 (1986). 
67. Ajay K. Mehotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists and 
the Intellectual Foundations if the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793, 1799 (2005). 
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distribution of fiscal burdens."68 Through the Sixteenth Amendment, the U.S. 
system of public finance "underwent a dramatic, structural transformation" in 
which fiscal policy came to be "guided not simply by the functional and struc-
tural need for government revenue, but by concerns for equity and economic 
and social justice."69 
The legacy of this movement, and not the doctrine of laissez-faire 
economics, best explains the corpus of U.S. federal business law that today gov-
erns extraterritorial business conduct. But the line between the Progressive Era 
and twenty-first century business law has a substantial connecting dot: the 
1960s and 1970s, when the paradigm that I now call progressive capitalism 
truly took shape. 
II. REDEFINING THE U.S. PARADIGM: PROGRESSIVE CAPITALISM 
In the 1960s, two major political movements culminated in federal law 
that would eventually reshape the U.S. international business regime. Tide VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created prohibitions against employment 
discrimination that Congress would amend in 1991 to apply extraterritorially.70 
The U.S. income tax code-which redistributed wealth through the financing 
of federal social programs-was amended in Subpart F to apply more vig-
orously to overseas corporate profits.71 
But the biggest, and gready underappreciated, era of international business 
law.reforms was the late 1970s under the presidency ofJimmy Carter. Between 
1976 and 1980, the paradigm of U.S. international business law that we can 
now call progressive capitalism crystallized in three distinct ways. First, the 
Carter administration pushed for the enactment of new legislation: The FCP A, 
enacted in 1977, was the first law anywhere in the world that specifically 
prohibited the bribing of overseas government officials for business purposes.72 
Second, the Carter administration fundamentally redefined an existing legal 
regime in pursuit of a new set of social goals. Economic sanctions, previously a 
component of military strategy that was framed by the two World Wars and the 
68. Id at 1798-99. 
69. Id at 1795. 
70. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2006)), 
amended by Civil Rights Act of1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
71. 26 U.S.C. §§ 951-964 (2006). 
72. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(1) (2006)). 
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Cold War, became an instrument for promoting human rights in developing 
countries.73 In the wake of these paradigm-changing events, human rights 
attorneys prevailed upon the judicial branch to effect the third major change. 
The Alien Tort Statute, a once obscure provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
that had laid largely dormant for nearly two centuries/4 was suddenly and 
dramatically refashioned into a means of holding persons liable for overseas 
human rights abuses?5 These three planks-anticorruption, democracy and 
individual rights, and the progressive redistribution of wealth through the fed-
eral income tax-best explain the federal laws that today constitute U.S. interna-
tional business law. Each area of law involves a knowing restraint on economic 
freedom to advance social and political goals. They are examples not of laissez-
faire, but rather of the Progressive Era's deliberate rejection of that doctrine. 
A. Combating Corruption: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
The FCP A prohibits the bribing of overseas officials for business 
purposes.76 Congress originally enacted the prohibition in 1977, and it became 
an important component of the Carter administration's push toward using 
business conduct to promote liberal democratic values. It was at first just a 
symbolic component and was scarcely enforced for the first twenty years of its 
existence. Then approximately ten years ago, owing to a combination of factors 
that scholars still only partially understand, the U.S. Department of]ustice and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated an extraordinarily 
dramatic surge in enforcement.77 Today, it is widely regarded as among the 
most important and fearsome statutes in international business, with fines 
routinely reaching in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars?8 Some have 
heralded the FCP A for effectuating a worldwide sea change in attitudes toward 
73. GARY CLYDE HOFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & BARBARA 
0EGG, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 1G-13 (3d ed. 2007). 
7 4. Alien Tort Statute (codified at 28 U.S. C. § 1350 (2006)). 
75. See irifi"a Part II.B.l. 
76. 91 Stat. 1494. 
77. David Stem, FCPA Enforcement and Compliance Strategies Overview, WINSTON & STRAWN, 
Nov. 17, 2009, httpJ /www.acc.com/chapterslsocaVupload/11-17-09-fcpa.pd£ 
78. The FCPA Explained, FCPA ENFORCEMENT, http://www.fcpaenforcement.com/explained/ 
explained. asp (last visited Dec. 9, 2011). 
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bribery.79 Others have decried its supposed cultural imperialism.80 However, 
none have characterized it as an instrument of laissez-faire economics. The 
statute emerged from two distinct corruption scandals of the 1970s that were 
replete with symbolic implications for international business and Western capi-
talism more generally. In 1971, Congress provided the Lockheed Corporation, 
then a major manufacturer of civilian and military aircraft, with a $250 million 
federal loan guarantee to prevent bankruptcy. Soon afterwards, regulators 
discovered that Lockheed had bribed several foreign governments to obtain 
contracts. Lockheed ultimately disclosed several multimillion dollar bribes to 
various countries, particularly the Netherlands, Japan, and Italy. These reve-
lations caused scandals that were embarrassing both to those countries and to the 
United States.81 The second scandal was Watergate, which exposed the illegal 
payments of various U.S. companies to domestic political campaigns.82 The SEC 
responded in 1974 by conducting an investigation and found that U.S. corpora-
tions had made covert payments not only to U.S. political campaigns, but also to 
overseas government officials, and were typically accounted for through "slush 
funds." As part of the post-Watergate reforms, Congress sought to supplement 
existing domestic antibribery legislation with comparable legislation that would 
prohibit payments to overseas officials and require more accurate accounting.83 
The legislative history from 1977 reflects a widespread willingness to 
forego economic advantages for the sake of promoting an anticorruption agenda 
that was understood fundamentally in social or moral, rather than economic, 
terms. Although the record reflects the substantial concern that the statute would 
put the United States at an economic disadvantage in international business, 
Congress nonetheless enacted the statute. Robert S. Ingersoll, then-Deputy 
79. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, The 1988 OECD 
Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business 
Transactions, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 485 (2000). 
80. See, e.g., Steven R Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 54 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 229 (1997). 
81. See Lockheed's Defiance: A Right to Bribe?, TIME, Aug. 18, 1975, http://www.time.com/time/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,917751-1,00.html. 
82. Spalding, supra note 11, at 359. 
83. See, e.g., Juscelino F. Colares, The Evolving Domestic and International Law Against Foreign 
Corruption: Some New and Old Dilemmas Facing the International Lawyer, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006); Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International Bribery 
Conventions, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 593, 595-96 (2002); Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide 
Banning of Schmiergeld· A Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on Its Twentieth Birthday, 18 
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269, 271-75 (1998); Daniel Patrick Ashe, Comment, The Lengthening 
Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United States: The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2897, 2902-Q3 (2005). 
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Secretary of State, stated, ''It is tempting to try to deal with the situation unilat-
erally, but there are serious risks for the United States in such an approach. 
There is widespread recognition in the Congress that such unilateral action 
would put U.S. companies at a serious disadvantage in the export trade."84 The 
International Chamber of Commerce similarly testified that unless prohibitions 
on overseas bribery were internationalized, it "could, and in some cases would, 
mitigate severely against U.S. business and prevent it from being able to compete 
effectively in quite substantial markets of the world."85 One senator stated: 
What disturbed me as I traveled around the world was the realiza-
tion that American business was being internationally blamed for 
activities which are very obvious to me were a very common practice 
throughout the entire world. Not only the countries of the West-
Western Europe, Japan, and the United States-but certainly through 
Mrica, the Middle East, and Asia. 86 
Another senator predicted that under unilateral legislation, "the American 
companies, who should be making payoffs then would be barred from making 
payoffs, the business that they should be getting would be going to foreign 
competitors who were undertaking the same practices."87 
Despite these reservations, Congress enacted the legislation. The legislative 
history further reflects that its passage was driven by a combination of promoting 
values and building alliances through the active, deliberate exportation of 
anticorruption norms. 
The Democrat George Ball expressed this view most forcefully: 
The vast volume of speeches, pamphlets, and advertising copy 
and propaganda leaflets extolling the virtues of free enterprise are 
cancelled every night when managements demonstrate by their conduct 
that a sector of multinational business activity is not free; it is bought 
and paid for. This is a problem that, like so many others, has relevance 
in the struggle of antagonistic ideologies; for, when our enterprises 
stoop to bribery and kickbacks, they give substance to the communist 
84. Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearing Bifore the Subcomm. on Priorities & Economy in Gov't of the 
joint Econ. Comm., 94th Cong. 153, 154 (1976). 
85. Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Bifi;re the Subcomm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Aifoirs, 
94th Cong. 39,49 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Banking Hearings]. 
86. Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad· Hearing Bifi;re the Subcomm. on lnt'l 
Trade of the S. Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Hearing] 
(statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoft). 
87. Id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoft). 
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myth-already widely believed in Third World countries-that 
capitalism is fundamentally corrupt.88 
Accordingly, the FCP A was originally conceived as a symbol of the notion 
that the United States did not stand for naked profit-seeking. Rather, its version 
of capitalism embraced the power of the federal government to restrict corporate 
profits in the name of advancing other social goals. 
B. Promoting Democracy and Human Rights 
U.S. corporations doing extraterritorial business are subject to substantial 
and multifaceted legal obligations to promote individual rights, regardless of any 
detrimental impact on profits. These include: the ATS; economic sanctions for 
human rights abuses; and laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, partic-
ularly, but not limited to, Tide VII. 
1. The Alien Tort Statute 
The ATS, a once obscure provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides 
simply that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States."89 From its enactment until1980, the law was invoked only 
twenty-one times,90 and only two courts had ever upheld jurisdiction under the 
statute.91 With the watershed case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980, the statute 
found new life and perhaps even assumed a new identity: an instrument for 
holding persons liable for overseas human rights abuses. But the statute would 
not be used against corporate defendants until 1997,92 when it became, quite 
suddenly, among the most controversial and high profile statutes in international 
business law. Since 1997, approximately 150 cases have been flied against cor-
porations. They have been flied in twenty-five different federal districts, with 
many in New York and California. Plaintiffs' judgments have ranged from $1.5 
million to $80 million, and settlements from $15.5 million to, reportedly, 
88. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 85, at 41-42 (statement of George Ball, Lehman Bros.). 
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
90. Kenneth C. Randall, Federal jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into the Alien 
Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &POL. 1, 4 n.15 (1985). 
91. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 
1795) (No. 1067). 
92. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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$30 million. Roughly one-third of these cases are presently pending in federal 
courts.93 Under the ATS, conduct construed to violate the "law of nations" has 
included arbitrary detention, the right to peaceful assembly, forced labor, racial 
discrimination, environmental harms, and breach of a duty to treat with 
dignity.94 They generally involve labor-related issues, issues related to the 
provision of support to repressive political regimes, acts by foreign security 
forces, or environmental damage.95 
The statute is today celebrated by a chorus of scholars for its impact on 
promoting human rights, while claims of its adverse impact on corporate profits 
are largely unheeded. Though the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and scholars 
sympathetic to the business community's concerns have called for amending or 
even abolishing the ATS,96 Congress has declined to stem the tide of human 
rights litigation against corporations. Indeed, academics have praised A TS 
litigation for its impact on promoting social or political values that are not 
closely connected to preserving or promoting the free market-namely, its 
influence in shaping the domestic legal regimes of developing countries. One 
writes that the ATS has played an "important role in the recent overall global 
development of enforceable human rights norms;"97 that it has "been heralded 
by foreign governments, international organizations, and U.N. agencies as a 
significant mechanism for enforcing international human rights norms;"98 and 
that it has continued the work of the Nuremberg Trials to "define and claruy 
the appropriate standard for corporate complicity in fundamental human 
93. JONATHAN DRIMMER, THE U.S. CHAMBER lNST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THINK 
GLOBALLY, SUE LOCALLY: OUT-OF-COURT TACTICS EMPLOYED BY PLAINTIFFS, 
THEIR LAWYERS, AND THEIR ADVOCATES IN TRANSNATIONAL TORT CASES 5 (2010), 
available at http:/ /www.insti tuteforlegalreform.com/images/ stories/ documents/pdf/international/ 
thinkgloballysuelocally.pdf. 
94. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien Tort 
Statute, 7]. INT'L ECON. L. 245,249 (2004). 
95. DRIMMER, supra note 93. 
96. See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HOFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING 
MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 55-56 (2003) (concluding that the 
solution to the various threats that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) poses to U.S. commercial and 
foreign policy interests is to amend the statute to define the causes of action, grant federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction, clarifY the aiding and abetting and color of law standards to require intent 
and substantial assistance, create a ten-year statute of limitations, and require the exhaustion of 
local remedies in the country of origin); see also BARRY E. CARTERET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 639-43 (4th ed. 2003); John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in US. Courts and 
Abroad· The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 V AND.]. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2009). 
97. Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56 
RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 971 (2004). 
98. Id at 975. 
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rights violations."99 Harold Koh sees the ATS as part of a broader movement 
of corporate social responsibility and observes that efforts to revise the ATS 
"undermine meaningful efforts to promote corporate responsibility abroad."100 
Others find that corporate liability under the ATS for human rights violations 
is a key component of the "constructive engagement" agenda, which holds that 
investment can be an effective means of promoting reforms in developing 
countries.101 By this position, liability "furthers rather than undermines construc-
tive engagement" by creating the legal conditions in which U.S. companies will 
"promote democracy and human rights in their interactions with foreign gov-
ernments and citizens by conveying democratic values and pushing for respect 
for the rule oflaw."102 
Just as the original purpose of the ATS is largely unknown and shrouded in 
mystery,103 the statute's current significance is the result of unlikely and partially 
unknown events. The statute remained largely dormant until the late 1970s, 
when the daughter of a Paraguayan physician named Joel Filartiga, who had 
been an outspoken critic of the Paraguayan government and whose son had been 
tortured and murdered by a high-ranking government official, America Norberta 
Peiia Irala, sought the legal advice of the Center for Constitutional Rights 
(CCR), a nongovernmental organization in New York City.104 Filartiga, the 
99. Id at 979. 
100. Koh, supra note 8, at 274. 
101. Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Efficts if Tort: How Ccnporate Complicity Liability Under the 
Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 209 (2008). 
102. Id 
103. Judge Friendly once called the ATS a "legal Lohengrin" because "no one seems to know whence it 
came." liT v. Vencap, Ltd, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). The very limited historical record 
suggests that the two incidents of assault of foreign ambassadors on U.S. soil originally 
precipitated its passage in 1789. Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, supra note 94, at 245; see Respublica v. 
De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111 (1784). Congress was "evidendy anxious to display American 
leadership in defending international standards of good behavior'' and wanted to signal that it 
"would not tolerate flagrant violations of the 'law of nations,m thereby avoiding international conflict 
given the "fragile peace that followed the end of the American Revolution." Id at 113-14. 
Others have argued that it meant to enforce those norms that were widely recognized as among 
the law of nations in 1789, which included the rights of ambassadors, the right of safe conduct, 
and prohibitions on piracy. See Kevin R Carter, Note, Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act: 
Protecting Human Rights or Closing Off Ccnporate Accountability, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 629, 
632 (2007) (citing Brad J. Kieserrnan, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational Ccnporate 
Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 891 (1999)); see 
also Yasmine A. Rassam, Contemporary Forms if Slavery and the Evolution if Slavery and the Slave 
Trade Under Customary International Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 330 (1999) (explaining that the law 
of nations expanded in the late 1800s to include prohibitions in slave trading). 
104. Ftlartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876,878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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physician, had brought a criminal suit against Peiia in Paraguay, which proved 
futile due to the severe harassment of his attorney and unexplained judicial delays. 
VVhen the daughter discovered that Peiia was living in Brooklyn, CCR sug-
gested an "experimental" approach-using a long-dormant and obscure provision 
of the 1789 Judiciary Act, now referred to as the Alien Tort Statute, to seek civil 
damages.105 Interestingly, no one at CCR remembers who originally suggested 
that the ATS could be used to bring an action in tort by a foreign national against 
a foreign national. One CCR attorney joked, "It was probably an intern."106 
CCR accordingly ftled suit in the Southern District of New York under 
wrongful death statutes, the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, the U.N. Declaration Against Torture, the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man, and "other pertinent declarations, documents, and 
practices constituting the customary international law of human rights and the 
law of nations," as well as the ATS.107 The district court granted the defendant's 
motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the "law of nations" 
excludes law that governs a state's treatment of its own citizens.108 On appeal, the 
Second Circuit held that "official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations" 
and that the distinction between official torture of nationals and foreigners-
suggested in dicta from intracircuit precedent109-is "out of tune with the current 
usage and practice ofinternationallaw."110 Addressing the jurisdictional question, 
the court concluded that the law of nations "has always been part of the federal 
common law,"111 and that although the statute did not grant new rights to aliens, 
it opened "the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by 
internationallaw."112 
Despite the power of this precedent, plaintiffs seeking relief from state actors 
faced a number of hurdles, including the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976, which creates a presumption of sovereign immunity from U.S. lawsuits 
unless a specific exception (such as the sponsorship of terrorism or commercial 
activities) applies. State actor defendants have also invoked various prudential 
court doctrines, especially the act of state and political question doctrines, to bar 
105. JEFFREY DAVIS, JUSTICE ACROSS BORDERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. 
COURTS 18 (2008). 
106. Id at 19. 
107. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879. 
108. Id 
109. Dreyfus v. Von Fmck, 534 F.2d 24,31 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). 
110. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884. 
111. Id at 885. 
112. Id at 887. 
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suits.113 Plaintiffs accordingly began seeking relief under the ATS from private 
parties, including both natural persons and corporations, thus transforming this 
statute yet again into a de facto law of U.S. international business. 
The first ATS case against a corporation would come about twenty years 
later, when citizens of Burma (Myanmar), again with the support of the CCR, 
fued a case against the Unocal Corporation alleging, inter alia, that it had aided 
and abetted the murder, rape, torture, and forced labor of villagers by the gov-
ernment in construction of a gas pipeline.U4 The Central District of California 
granted summary judgment in favor of Unocal, and on appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed Filartiga's holding that customary international law is part of 
the federal common law.115 It further assumed, without argument, that if the 
ATS establishes federal jurisdiction over private parties, that jurisdiction extends 
to corporations as well.U6 As the case law concerning private defendants devel-
oped, two categories of cases emerged. Corporations could be sued for their own 
conduct, or they could be sued for acts committed principally by foreign states. 
In the latter cases, plaintiffs alleged that the corporations were acting "under 
color oflaw" or were 'joint actors" with the foreign government.117 
Recent litigation has raised, or failed to resolve, two significant legal issues. 
The first is the U.S. Supreme Court's first and oruy opinion on the ATS, Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain,U8 which addressed what some have called "the most contested 
issue in U.S. foreign relations law during the last decade:"119 the status of cus-
tomary international law (CIL) in U.S. courts. Some scholars had argued what 
113. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 73, at 5. 
114. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
115. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 933 (9th Cir. 2002). 
116. Id. at 945-56. More recendy, the Second Circuit specifically addressed, as a matter of first 
impression, the question of whether the ATS confers jurisdiction over claims against corporate 
defendants. K.iobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). The court held 
that customary international law provides not only the underlying causes of action under the ATS, 
but also whether the scope of liability extends to the defendant. Id. at 128. It held that corporate 
liability for violations of international law is not itself a rule of customary international law because it 
is not a "specific, universal, and obligatory norm" and has not attained acceptance among the nations 
of the world. Id. at 145. Although the opinion at first glance may seem to sound the death knell 
for corporate liability under the ATS, two factors suggest otherwise: (1) the opinion may be reversed 
by an en bane panel or by the U.S. Supreme Court, and (2) much ATS litigation is flled outside 
the Second Circuit, and, even if Kiobel were to withstand review, that portion would certainly rise 
quite dramatically. 
117. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 73, at 5; see also Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting qf 
Human Rights Violations: ConfUsion in the Courts, 6 NW. U.}. INT'L HUM. RTS. 304, 317-26 
(2008). 
118. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
119. Bradley et al., supra note 8, at 871. 
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would later be called the "modem position"-that CIL had the status of self-
executing federal common law, which the courts could apply without any express 
authorization from Congress.120 "Revisionists," on the other hand, argued that 
CIL had the status of federal common law only when the courts had express 
authorization from the Constitution or the political branches.121 The Sosa 
Court resolved it in such a manner that both sides claimed victory;122 it held that 
the ATS authorized federal courts to recognize federal common law causes of 
action for only a "limited number of CIL violations,"123 particularly those that 
have no "less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 
historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted."124 Thus, despite 
the Supreme Court weighing in, the status of CIL in federal courts remains 
very much unresolved. 
The second issue is whether liability under the ATS extends to corporate 
defendants. The Second Circuit recendy addressed this issue as a matter of first 
impression in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum125 and found that customary 
international law provides not only the underlying causes of action under the 
ATS, but also the scope of liability.126 It found that corporate liability for 
violations of international law is not itself a rule of customary international law 
because it is not a "specific, universal, and obligatory norm" and has not attained 
acceptance among the nations of the world.127 The impact of this holding will 
be limited by the fact that much A TS litigation is filed outside the Second 
Circuit, and if Kiobel were to withstand en bane review, that portion would 
certainly increase quite dramatically. Accordingly, the ATS remains a viable 
instrument for holding corporations liable for human rights abuses, irrespective 
of any alleged competitive disadvantage. 
120. See Lea Brihnayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 
SUP. CT. REv. 295, 303-D4; Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1561 (1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 
111 HARV. L. REV.1824, 184H7 (1998). 
121. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); A.M. Weisburd, State 
Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE]. INT'L L. 1 (1995); see also Phillip R. 
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986). 
122. See Bradley et al., supra note 8, at 872. 
123. Id. at 893. 
124. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
125. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
126. Id. at 128. 
127. Id. at 145. 
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2. Economic Sanctions for Human Rights Abuses 
Economic sanctions, though generally not thought of in the context of 
business law, are fundamentally a restraint on business activity. Despite their 
long history, not until the presidency of Jimmy Carter did sanctions become an 
instrument of promoting human rights and, by extension, the kinds of social 
values that are the subject of this Article. 
Sanctions would not become a regular tool of modern history until after 
World War I, and through the first couple of decades following World War II, 
particularly with the onset of the Cold War, sanctions generally preceded or 
accompanied major military efforts.128 Examples from the United States would 
include the sanctions against Iran in 1951, North Vietnam in 1954, Laos in 
1956, Cuba in 1960, and South Vietnam in 1963.129 The social value thrust of 
sanctions would develop in the 1960s and then fully mature in the 1970s under 
the leadership of President Carter, as economic sanctions increasingly focused 
on the promotion ofhuman rightsY0 
Ample commentary attests to the nature of economic sanctions as a restraint 
on profit-seeking to achieve social goals not narrowly related to the market. 
As one scholar observed, "the basic purpose of economic sanctions throughout 
history has always been restricting foreign trade and finance or withholding 
economic benefits such as state aid from targeted states ... to accomplish broader 
security or foreign policy objectives."131 They are a form of"economic statecraft" 
that involves the withdrawal of economic resources to achieve a policy change 
in the target country.132 Sanctions "institute a deliberate programme of action 
to disrupt or terminate an ongoing economic relationship between the sender 
and target countries. Since this ongoing relationship is mutually beneficial ... its 
interruption will be costly to both parties."133 In fact, the threat of sanctions, or 
the sanctions themselves, would have no teeth but for the volume of business 
activity between the sender and the target. By curtailing that activity and 
withdrawing financial support, the United States aims to "hamper the target 
128. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 73, at 10. 
129. Id at 21-23. 
130. Id at 13. 
131. SAMUEL KERN ALEXANDER Ill, ECONOMJC SANCTIONS: LAW AND PuBLIC POLICY 10 
(2009). 
132. STEVE CHAN & A. COOPER DRURY, SANCTIONS AS ECONOMJC STATECRAFT: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 1 (2000). 
133. Id at9. 
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country's economy and redistribute income, status, and influence among its 
domestic constituents."134 
Sanctions for human rights thus represent the policy determination that 
the sender country cares, for example, more about "human rights or racial 
equality in China and South Mrica respectively than commercial sales to and 
corporate investments in those countries."135 They represent the determination 
that sender nations "obviously care about matters other than trade and 
investment. If this were not the case, none would have bothered to threaten or 
actually undertake sanctions which are precisely intended to use economic lev-
erage to obtain political concessions."136 Indeed, the frequency and intensity 
of sanctions represents the sender's "willingness to suffer substantial economic 
and political costs to itself for the sake of achieving its declared objective .... 
Accordingly, a sender's self-inflicted costs provide an indicator of its seri-
ousness and determination."137 
The most comprehensive analysis of economic sanctions is the collab-
orative work of Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Je.ffiey Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and 
Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.138 Originally published in 1985 
and updated in 1990 and then again in 2007, the authors analyze 174 examples 
of economic sanctions. They define sanctions as the "deliberate, government-
inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial 
relations."139 In sanctions jargon, the country applyirlg the sanctions is often 
called the "sender" and the sanctioned country is the "target." With respect to the 
senders, sanctions can be unilateral or multilateral, although the latter usually 
134. Id. at 5. 
135. Id at9. 
136. Id at 10. 
137. Id at 13. 
138. HOFBAUER ET AL., supra note 73. 
139. Id at 3. An alternative definition holds that any conduct intentionally depriving a people of its 
"means to an effective economic life" counts as sanctions. GEOFF Sll'v!ONS, IMPOSING ECONOMJC 
SANCTIONS: LEGAL REMEDY OR GENOCIDAL TOOL? 11 (1999). This definition would even 
treat military conduct that adversely impacted a target's economy as sanctions and is thus 
significantly broader than any generally accepted usage. Another available definition is "coercive 
economic measures taken against one or more countries to force a change in politics, or at least to 
demonstrate a country's opinion about the other's policies." DIANNE E. RENNACK & ROBERT 
D. SHUEY, ECONOMJC SANCTIONS TO ACHIEVE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS: 
DISCUSSION AND GUIDE TO CURRENT LAW 2 (1998), cited in HOSSEIN G. AsKARI, JOHN 
FORRER, HILDY TEEGEN &]lAWEN YANG, ECONOMJC SANCTIONS: EXAMINING THEIR 
PHILOSOPHY AND EFFICACY 14 (2003). This definition is not preferred because it excludes the 
possibility that sanctions may be expressive tools and not necessarily designed to "bring about a 
change in behavior or policies." 
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involve major powers persuading their smaller allies to join.140 Sanctions 
can involve any or all of three types of customary trade or financial relations: 
limitations on imports, limitations on exports, and restricting the flow of 
finance. 141 The target country need not be the adversary of the sender and, indeed, 
many of the most successful documented instances of sanctions have involved 
a friendly target who promptly acquiesced to the sender's demands.142 
Sanctions may serve either of two purposes. While the most obvious 
purpose of economic sanctions would be to "coerc[ e] target governments into 
particular avenues of response,"143 economists and political scientists have 
explained that economic sanctions might also be designed to accomplish an 
entirely different, noninstrumental goal. Under this alternative theory, sanctions 
are not necessarily designed to effect reforms in the target countries, and their 
success thus should not necessarily be measured by the extent of any resulting 
reforms. William Kaempfer and Anton Lowenberg have contrasted the 
"instrumental" theory of sanctions with the "expressive" purpose.144 According 
to this theory, the value of sanctions lies in "taking a moral stance against some 
other nation's objectionable behavior."145 When a target country offends the 
sender state, but the sender's leaders may deem more severe intervention such 
as military action inappropriate, the sender's leaders may nonetheless feel 
compelled to "do something."146 While the costs of military action may be too 
high, the political costs of doing nothing may be considerable to the extent that 
it projects weakness.147 Such domestic political pressure can "persuade the gov-
ernment in the sanctioning nation to respond by imposing sanctions to meet 
goals other than target compliance."148 Indeed, the expressive purpose of 
sanctions sometimes occurs despite its instrumental ineffectiveness, but often 
140. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 73, at 5. 
141. Id. at 44-45. 
142. See id. at 60. 
143. Id. at 5. 
144. William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, The Theory if" International Economic Sanctions: A 
Public Choice Approach, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 786, 786 (1988). 
145. Id.; see also PER LUNDBORG, THE ECONOMJCS OF ExPoRT EMBARGOES: THE CASE OF 
THE Us-SOVIET GRAJN SUSPENSION (1987). 
146. Ivan Eland, Economic Sanctions as Tools if Foreign Policy, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: PANACEA 
OR PEACEBUIUDNG IN A POST -COLD WAR WORLD? 29 (David Cortright & George Lopez 
eds., 1995). 
147. See DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMJC STATECRAFT AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1999) (discussing political costs). 
148. Eland, supra note 146, at 29. 
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the sanctions are "designed deliberately to be ineffectual."149 The expressive 
purpose of sanctions is even further testament to the noneconomic feature of 
so-called economic sanctions. While these sanctions curtail economic activity, 
they by and large do so not to effectuate changes in economic conditions, but 
rather to promote social and political goals. 
But even economic sanctions that are instrumental in design are 
fundamentally noneconomic when imposed in protest of human rights abuses. 
The term "economic" in "economic sanctions" refers to the means, not the 
ends. The United States employs economic means to achieve social and 
political ends. That is, the United States curtails business activity to achieve 
goals that have little to do with market conditions or profit. 
3. The Extraterritorial Application of Employment Discrimination Laws 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is of course the bedrock U.S. 
statute addressing discrimination in employment.150 Though its role in domestic 
antidiscrimination efforts is familiar,151 few appreciate the scope of its appli-
cation to extraterritorial conduct, and its prominence in the basket of legal 
obligations that businesses bring with them when conducting business overseas. 
Title VII originally contained no language expressly extending coverage to 
individuals working overseas for corporations owned or controlled by American 
persons. When faced with the question in 1991, the Supreme Court invoked 
the nineteenth century presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. 
statutes absent express statutory direction, and thus limited Title VII's coverage 
to practices arising in connection with work performed in the United States.152 
In direct response to this case, Congress inserted a provision into the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 that overturned the decision by extending coverage to 
include U.S. citizens employed in a foreign country.153 As a result, corporations 
149. Id Scholars have debated the expressive function in law generally. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On 
the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,2035 (1996). 
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
151. See, e.g., Stuart]. Ishimaru, Fu!filling the Promise ofTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964, 36 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 25 (2005) (examining Title VII's impact on sex and race in employment); Charity 
Williams, Note, Misperceptions Matter: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964 Protects Employees 
From Discrimination Based on Misperceived Religious Status, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 357 (providing 
background on religious discrimination challenges in today's workplaces). 
152. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 
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now falling within the Act's statute include not only U.S. corporations, but also 
foreign corporations controlled by American employers.154 
Moreover, two federal courts have held that the bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ2 must operate in foreign countries just as it does 
domestically, regardless of the legal or cultural practices of those foreign 
countries. A U.S. oil company that worked in Latin American countries 
declined to promote a female employee to vice president of international 
operations because "Latin American clients would react negatively to a woman 
vice-president."155 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that 
gender was a BFOQin this context and held that just as customer preference 
cannot be the basis of a BFOQin a domestic setting, it cannot be the basis in 
an international setting.156 It added, ''Though the United States cannot impose 
standards of non-discriminatory conduct on other nations through its legal 
system, the district court's rule would allow other nations to dictate discrimina-
tion in this country."157 Similarly, where the Baylor University medical school 
excluded Jewish physicians from participating in a rotation program that sent 
doctors to Saudi Arabia due to that country's "apparent hostility to Jews," the 
Southern District of Texas held that "patronizing, paternalistic 'concerns' of 
Baylor for the safety of Jews in Saudi Arabia" do not constitute a BFOQ158 
Interestingly, these cases predate the 1991 extraterritorial amendment and 
illustrate the inherent force ofTitle VII to push across national boundaries. 
Though Title VII is the predominant employment discrimination statute, 
it does not stand alone and is accompanied by others that also apply extrater-
ritorially. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination 
based on disabilities in the employment context.159 The 1991 amendments to 
the Civil Rights Act that amended Title VII to apply extraterritorially similarly 
amended the ADA.160 Additionally, the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) forbids age discrimination against persons over forty years old 
in hiring, firing, promotions, applications, and other "terms, conditions, or 
154. Id § 2000e-1(c)(2). Title VII exempts conduct that would cause any U.S. employer to violate the 
law of the foreign workplace. Id § 2000e-1(b). 
155. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1981). 
156. Id at 1277. 
157. Id 
158. Abrams v. Baylor Coil. of Med., 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984), qffd in part and rev'd in 
part, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986). 
159. Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006), amended by Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(b)(2)(B), 105 Stat. 1071 [hereinafter ADA]. 
160. Id § 12112(c)(2)(B). 
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privileges of employment."161 Though a statute of lesser impact, the ADEA 
actually set the precedent that Congress evidently followed in amending Title 
VII. In 1984, the Third Circuit decided that the ADEA did not apply 
extraterritorially, 162 and Congress immediately responded by amending the 
ADEA.163 The extraterritorial application ofTitle VII is now coextensive with 
theADEA. 
Accordingly, Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA combine to create a 
significant set of antidiscrimination laws with which all business must comply 
when working overseas. Though many have argued that the extraterritorial 
application of these statutes does not go far enough, and specifically that their 
coverage should not be limited to U.S. employees,164 these laws nonetheless 
figure prominently in understanding the practical and symbolic significance of 
the U.S. regime of international business law. 
C. Income Taxation: The Antideferral Regime for Extraterritorial 
Corporate Profits 
As discussed above, adoption of the federal income tax represented a 
significant shift in the role of government in commercial activity. Today, the 
U.S. government has developed a complex scheme to ensure that U.S. corpora-
tions, even in their extraterritorial conduct, finance federal programs through 
the taxation of corporate profits. 
As a general rule, the profits of U.S. corporations from their ownership 
interests in foreign corporations are not taxed until the earnings are repatriated 
to U.S. shareholders in the form of a dividend or realized by U.S. shareholders 
161. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S. C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) [hereinafter ADEA]. 
One Circuit has held that it also prohibits the creation of an "age-hostile" environment. Crawford 
v. Medina Gen. Hasp., 96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 1996). 
162. Cleary v. United States, 728 F.2d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 1984). 
163. 29 U.S.C. § 623(h); see also Morelli v. Cede!, 141 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that ADEA 
extends to U.S. branches offoreign employers). 
164. See, e.g., Paul Frantz, International Employment: Antidiscrimination Law Should Follow Employees 
Abroad, 14MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 227,229 (2005) (stating that Tide VII, the ADA, and the 
ADEA should apply to lawful permanent residents working for overseas U.S. corporations); 
Kathy Roberts, Correcting Culture: Extraterritoriality and U.S. Employment Discrimination Law, 
24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 295, 331 (2007) (concluding that Tide VII, the ADA, and the 
ADEA should be extended to non-U.S. employees of U.S. companies working both domestically 
and abroad); Carson Sprott, Note, Competitive and Fair: The Case for Exporting Stronger 
Extraterritorial Labor and Employment Protection, 33 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 479, 
500 (2010) (stating that U.S. labor law should be applied universally to all employees, including 
non-U.S. employees working for U.S. corporations overseas). 
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from the sale of shares.165 This practice of postponing taxation of profits until 
repatriation is known as deferral and reflects the longstanding U.S. tax policies 
that foreign profits of foreign entities should not be taxed and that foreign-
chartered corporations are distinct legal entities.166 When a foreign-chartered 
corporation is owned by a U.S. corporation, the result is that profits attributable 
to U.S. shareholders escape U.S. tax as long as they are reinvested in foreign 
tax jurisdictions; hence the frequent establishment of subsidiaries in low-tax 
foreign jurisdictions. Such has been the tax policy of the United States since the 
original enactment of the federal income tax with the Sixteenth Amendment in 
1913. From that date through the 1950s, U.S. multinational corporations could 
operate in complete freedom from current U.S. income taxation as long as they 
conducted their business through foreign subsidiaries.167 These policies were 
essentially abused through manipulating income by shifting mobile forms of 
income to foreign low-tax jurisdictions, especially through establishing foreign 
holding companies (companies formed to earn mobile passive income) or base 
companies (companies in low-tax jurisdictions that serve as conduits for the 
overseas sales of U.S.-manufactured goods).168 As early as 1937, Congress 
recognized the need to impose limits on the privilege of deferral to preserve the 
U.S. tax base, but business interests successfully resisted. 
The movement to subject extraterritorial profits to an income tax regime 
would gain sufficient momentum in the 1960s as the United States was running 
a large budget deficit and the ease with which U.S. corporations could defer 
income taxation was increasingly perceived as a contributing factor. The Kennedy 
administration thus introduced radical new international taxation legislation 
that was based upon a policy of global tax neutrality-that the business activity 
of foreign subsidiaries would be taxed at the same rate as wholly domestic U.S. 
corporations.169 The business community gave significant pushback on the 
grounds that global tax neutrality would put U.S. corporations at a competitive 
disadvantage.170 The two sides achieved a compromise in 1962 with enactment 
of the first significant constraint on deferral. The result, Subpart F, currently 
165. MICHAEL}. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF lNfERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 217 (2003). 
166. Id 
167. Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Lift, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck in the 
Middle With Subpart F, 79TEX. L. REV.1525, 1527 (2001). 
168. GRAETZ, supra note 165, at 217-18. 
169. Engel, supra note 167. 
170. Id 
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taxes-that is, does not permit tax deferral of-certain types of income, 171 
and only by a "controlled foreign corporation" (CFC). A CFC is generally a 
foreign corporation that is majority owned by U.S. persons (counting only the 
shareholders who own at least 10 percent of the stock).172 Subpart F identifies 
several types of CFC income that are subject to current taxation based on the 
ease with which they can be shifted to low-tax jurisdictions.173 Disfavored 
income generally includes income from passive investments, especially income 
generated by stocks and bonds.174 
Since the original enactment of Subpart F, the United States has enacted a 
"series of extremely complex and somewhat overlapping anti-deferral regimes" 
to complement, or complicate, Subpart F.175 Many scholars argue that the 
provisions that apply to extraterritorial corporate profit are not as progressive 
as they should be.176 Nonetheless, it remains true that the U.S. antideferral rules 
of Subpart F are "harsher" than the rules of other developed countries, indi-
cating, in the words of one scholar, not that the United States should join a "race 
to the bottom," but rather to the contrary, that "the rest of the developed world 
has not joined the United States in a 'race to the top."'177 'The United States has 
tried to lead and, while many have followed, none has followed quite as far 
as the United States has gone."178 The U.S. system, while not the most severe in 
every single instance, is generally "almost always the harshest, sometimes by a 
wide margin."179 
The antideferral regime thus rounds out the model of progressive capi-
talism that the United States imposes on corporations in their extraterritorial 
conduct. The following Part contrasts this model with its Chinese counterpart. 
It shows that China does not impose any of the legal constraints on business 
conduct included in this study: It has deliberately refused to enact anticorruption 
laws, despite substantial worldwide lobbying; it does not hold its corporations 
171. Id at 1528. 
172. GRAETZ, supra note 165, at 218. 
173. Id 
17 4. Engel, supra note 167, at 1528. 
175. Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Riform of the U.S. International Income 
Tax Rules, 51 U.MIAMI L. REv. 975,986 (1997). 
176. Id. at 1010-11. 
177. NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, INC., THE NFfC FOREIGN INCOME PROJECT: 
INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENIURY 24 (2001), available at http:// 
www.nftc.org/default/tax/fipiNFfC1ao/o20Volume2(1).pd£ 
178. Id 
179. Id 
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liable for complicity in human rights abuses; it very rarely imposes economic 
sanctions, and never for human rights abuses; and it does not have effective 
laws prohibiting discrimination in employment. As such, with respect to the 
kinds of social values that these laws are designed to promote and despite its 
practice of owning or subsidizing corporations, China's legal regime is 
substantially laissez-faire. 
III. CHINA'S NEW LAISSEZ-F AIRE 
The existing scholarship on Chinese international business law draws on 
two unvarying themes. The first is the relative heaviness of the Chinese state vis-
a-vis Western liberalism. This literature has developed terms such as "state 
capitalism"180 or "socialist market economy"181 to capture China's supposedly 
heavy-handed curtailment of individual freedoms generally, while only reluc-
tantly and incrementally implementing liberal market reforms. Scholarship 
focusing specifically on China's international business regime develops a second 
theme, emphasizing the increasingly aggressive role of Chinese business, 
encouraged and subsidized by the state, in investing in developing countries. 
This literature focuses, accurately, on the Chinese government's recognized 
need to obtain natural resources, create markets for its products, and build 
political alliances to increase its international influence. However, scarcely 
understood is the legal regime that directs this extraterritorial conduct. Terms 
such as "state capitalism" accurately capture the Chinese government's 
approaches to areas such as industrial policy or financial regulation, where the 
state's hand is indeed heavier than most Western counterparts. However, these 
terms do not capture China's distinctive approach with respect to the values that 
are the subject of this Article. When focusing on such areas as combating 
corruption and promoting human rights, the Chinese regime of international 
business is striking not for the heaviness of the state's hand, but for its 
lightness-that is, the absence of laws curtailing profit-seeking to achieve other 
goals. Put another way, profit-seeking, or economic development, is itself the 
predominant political goal. By seeking profits, Chinese businesses are thought 
to advance the economic growth that will secure allegiance to the state and 
preclude widespread social resistance. In this sense, the Chinese regime is more 
accurately understood as substantially laissez-faire. 
180. HALPER, supra note 23, at 30-31. 
181. XING, supra note 25, at 5. 
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A. The Political Purposes of Chinese Business 
Shortly after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the 
Communist government under Mao Zedong confiscated the preexisting pri-
vate companies and converted them into state-owned enterprises (SOEs).182 
In the ensuing years, initially under the first Five Year Plan of 1953-57, the 
government further nationalized industry by placing SOEs under the control 
of local government bodies for the purpose of developing a Soviet-style 
command economy.183 The government took control over such fundamental 
SOE operations as labor recruitment, finance, materials, production, supply, 
and marketing.184 
After Mao's death in 1978, a new coalition of conservative leadership, led 
by Deng Xiaoping, took control of the government. These leaders' principal 
focus was lifting China out of poverty; they believed that doing so required 
reformation of China's economic structure.185 Accordingly, Deng implemented 
a series of liberalizing reforms to make SO Es more productive. These early 
reforms set in motion a process whereby business would continue to serve 
the political purpose of preserving the Communist Party's power and its role 
as exclusive custodian of the common good. But the means of achieving this 
objective would change fundamentally. Rather than collectivization, the means 
of promoting the common good became profit. Deng's vision was that eco-
nomic prosperity would stabilize society and preserve the state's power. 
Economic growth, then, became the political purpose ofbusiness. 
In the early 1990s, the party accelerated its reforms of the ownership 
structure of SOEs and instituted more standardized corporate governance, 
passing the Company Law in 1993.186 Radical reforms continued through the 
late 1990s as the government formulated a new strategy: "grasping the large and 
letting the small go."187 This referred to cultivating large SOEs that were strong 
and competitive and eventually developing them into multinational companies, 
182. Neal Stevens, Comment, Confronting the Crisis of Insolvency in China's State-Owned Enterprises: 
Can the Proposed Bankruptcy Law Erase the Red Ink?, 16 WIS. INT'L L.J. 551, 553 n.13 (1998) 
(citing jiANFU CHEN, FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUfHORISATION TO PRIVATE LAW, A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECDVE OF THE DEVELOPING CIVIL LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 75 (1995)). 
183. Id. at 553 n.15. 
184. Id. at 553-54; see also CHEN, supra note 182. 
185. Stevens, supra note 182, at 555-56. 
186. Id. at 557. 
187. XING, supra note 25, at 11. 
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while giving up control of smaller and less strategic enterprises. The ultimate 
goal of these reforms was to allow the state to retreat from select sectors through 
privatization, while continuing to dominate a few strategic industries.188 The 
government implemented recapitalization reforms to make the large, strategic 
SOEs more efficient by converting state loans to equities, authorizing state 
banks to write off bad loans, selectively listing firms in stock markets, and 
allowing the firms to form joint ventures with foreign investors.189 Today, 
SOEs are not monopolies; rather, they are subjected to competition both 
domestically and internationally.190 They also are allowed to raise large amounts 
of private capital; all of the twelve biggest initial public offerings on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 were state enterprises.191 SOEs have access 
to banks as well as the stock market, and some scholars estimate that up to 
99 percent of bank loans to Chinese companies go to these firms. 192 The cost of 
capital is low and the banks are lenient in enforcing the terms of repayment 
for SOEs, while the private sector struggles comparatively to raise capital.193 
Because privatization has ultimately meant subjecting state-owned companies to 
private competition and private markets, the firms are thus hybrids that have 
characteristics of both public and private companies.194 Unlike other transi-
tional economies such as the Russian Federation, China has never aspired to 
complete privatization.195 
The statistics confirm that as a result of these reforms, SOEs became 
smaller in number but larger in assets and profitability. From 1998 to 2007, 
the number of state-owned firms shrank from 64,737 to 20,680, and the per-
centage of the labor force from 60.5 percent to 22.1 percent. However, total 
assets more than doubled from 7.5 trillion yuan to 15.8 trillion, and profits from 
52 billion to 1.1 trillion.196 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. JACQUES, supra note 26, at 184. 
191. Id. 
192. Gordon Redding & Michael A. Witt, Post-Transition China 8 ONSEAD, Working Paper No. 
2010/25/EPS/EFE, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1590267 (citing KS. TSAI, 
CAPITALISM WITHOUT DEMOCRACY: THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA (2007)). 
193. Id. 
194. JACQUES, supra note 26. 
195. XING, supra note 25, at 12. 
196. Id. 
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These reforms were imbued with a profound political purpose: to promote 
economic growth and social harmony and preserve the power of the Communist 
Party. The large SOEs represent "state tools toward driving economic devel-
opment and a Chinese presence in [strategic] industries."197 Business, therefore, is 
directed to meet the "state's development goals," not just serve the financial 
interests of the business sector. 198 Sectors such as retail, agriculture, and service 
industries (other than banking) are now substantially private, while large stra-
tegic sectors like steel, aluminum, energy, transportation, communications, and 
banking remain government-owned.199 Government policy is to retain state con-
trol in these strategic industries as a means of maintaining socialist characteristics 
within a market economy-the so-called "socialist market economy."200 The 
state "acts as the dominant economic player and uses markets primarily for 
political gain."201 The ultimate motive is "maximizing the state's power and the 
leadership's chances of survival."202 
Given the political imperative of maximizing economic growth, the 
Chinese legal regime encourages profit-seeking in extraterritorial business 
without much regard for the externalities that progressive capitalism addresses. 
Indeed, in discrete respects, China's system resembles the laissez-faire against 
which American progressivism reacted. 
B. China's Alternative to Progressive Capitalism 
The political regime that governs China's business activity-both domestic 
and international-stands in stark contrast to the progressive capitalist regime 
of U.S. international business law. Given the narrow focus of Chinese business 
regulation on promoting economic growth, China's legal regime generally 
includes a "proclivity for corruption ... and human rights violations."203 
Accordingly, in the areas of this study, particularly corruption and human rights, 
Chinese business law is substantially silent. 
197. Redding & Witt, supra note 192. 
198. BREMMER, supra note 24, at 134. 
199. Redding & Witt, supra note 192, at 9-10. 
200. XING, supra note 25, at 5; see also BREMMER, supra note 24, at 135. 
201. BREMMER, supra note 24, at 5. 
202. Id. at4. 
203. HALPER, supra note 23, at 170. 
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1. Corruption 
Ample scholarship exists on the nature and magnitude of corruption in 
Chinese society. Scholars have identified various causes of Chinese corruption. 
One scholar holds that the development of a market economy after 1978 led to 
an increase in corruption, as foreign investors arrived who were willing and able 
to pay higher prices to obtain favorable treatment.204 Another study finds a 
link between the relative stagnation of the salaries of public officials' incomes 
in relation to the managers of state-owned and private enterprises.205 Yet 
another study looks at the lack of control and centralization in China's vast 
bureaucracy, which led to factional conflict at the top and at the bottom, 
resulting in an increase in autonomy and a decrease in accountability.206 Still 
other studies include several other factors: the lack of effective checks and 
balances in the national government, the lack of independence in anticorruption 
agencies/07 and the deeply-rooted Chinese cultural norms of gift giving and 
sustaining personal relationships.208 
Like virtually every country, China has domestic anticorruption laws on 
the books. And on the face of these laws, it would appear that they have some 
teeth. The key sections of the revised criminal law dealing with political cor-
ruption are graft and bribery offenses,209 dereliction of duty,210 and offenses 
204. Kin-man Chan, C01TUption in China: A Principle-Agent Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE PuBLIC ADMlNISTRATION IN THE ASIA-PACIF1C BASIN 308 (Hoi-kwok 
Wong & Hon S. Chan eds., 1999); see also XIAOBO LU, CADRES AND CORRUPTION, THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PAR1Y 18 (2000); Zengke 
He, C01TUption and Anti-C01TUption in Riform China, 33 COMMUNIST & POST -COMMUNIST 
STUD. 243,248-51 (2000). 
205. LU, supra note 204, at 190; He, supra note 204, at 251. 
206. Chan, supra note 204, at 311-14; He, supra note 204, at 251-53. As one scholar famously put it, 
"corruption = monopoly + discretion - accountability." ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING 
CORRUPTION 75 (1988). For a broader discussion of bureaucratic and legal reforms to prevent 
corruption, see Sahr J. Kpundeh & Irene Hors, Overview, in CORRUPTION & INTEGRI1Y 
IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7-12 (United Nations Dev. 
Programme & OECD Dev. Centre eds., 1998), available at http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/ 
Docs/ efal corruption.htrn#Overview. 
207. LU, supra note 204, at 156-57; He, supra note 204, at 253-54. 
208. He, supra note 204, at 255-56. 
209. See WEI LUO, THE 1997 CRIMlNAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: WITH 
ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND INTRODUCTION 197-203, art. 382-96 (1998), available at 
http://www.colaw.cn/findlaw/crime/criminallaw3.html. 
210. Id at 205-12, art. 397-419. 
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against company and enterprise management.211 Bribery is defined in careful 
detail,212 and the offense is defined broadly. It may be committed by anyone who 
is a state functionary regardless of rank or position and covers anyone performing 
public duties, not just government officials.213 It covers both active demand 
and passive receipt of illegal consideration.214 It encompasses grease payments 
for routine or ministerial government action.215 Receiving gifts of substantial 
value from foreign interests is specifically prohibited.216 Chinese anti-corruption 
efforts have generally been limited to the prosecution of high-profile cases 
involving high-profile officials.217 While various Chinese companies have 
been prosecuted for overseas business bribery under the laws of other jurisdic-
tions, particularly the United States,218 and Chinese officials have been selectively 
prosecuted for receiving bribes from foreign companies,219 and even foreign 
211. Id. at 94-99, art. 158-69 (which apply, inter alia, to management of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs)). 
212. Id. at 199-200, art. 385,387 (solicitation and/or receipt ofbribes by state functionaries); id at 201, 
art. 391 (offering of bribes to seek illegitimate gain). 
213. Id. at 197, art. 382; see also Official Reply of Supreme People's Procuratorate Regarding Criminal 
Responsibility of Civilian Employees at Prison Facilities, in FALO QyANSHU ZENGBIANBEN 
71 (1994). 
214. CHINESE CRIMINAL LAW 650,652-53 (Jia Yu & You Wei eds., 1997). 
215. See Hilary K. Josephs, The Upright and the Low-Down: An Examination of Official Corruption in 
the United States and the People's Republic of China, 27 SYRACUSE}. INT'L L. &COM. 269,297-
98 (2000). 
216. LUO, supra note 209, at 202, art. 394. 
217. For an in-depth study of the modem history of China's corruption prosecutions and public 
relations efforts and their failure to effect widespread corruption reduction, see Benjamin van 
Rooij, China's War on Graft: Politico-Legal Campaigns Against Corruption in China and Their 
Similarities to the Legal Reactions to Crisis in the U.S., 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 289,298-
308 (2005). 
218. For example, in 2009, the U.S. Department of Justice alleged that in 2005 a subsidiary of China 
Communication Construction paid bribes amounting to U.S. $1.76 million to the son of a former 
Bangladesh prime minister in connection with a Bangladesh port project. Press Release, U.S. Dep't 
of Justice, Department of Justice Seeks to Recover Approximately $3 Million in Illegal Proceeds 
From Foreign Bribe Payments (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/ 
January/09-crm-020.html. In November 2009, the accused Bangladeshi party in that case was 
charged with money laundering in connection with the alleged bribes. Chaitanya Chandra Halder, 
Koko Charged With Money Laundering, DAILY STAR, Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.thedailystar.net/ 
newDesign/news-details.php?nid=113862; see also FRITz HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, 
PROGRESS REPORT 2010: ENFORCEMEJ\'T OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN 0FF1CIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 66-67 (2010), available at http://www.transparency.cv'doc/2010Progress_ 
Report_2nd_edition_10.9.10.pd£ 
219. For example, the companies IBM, NCR, and Hitachi were named in a 2006 court verdict against 
the former president of the China Construction Bank, who was sentenced to ftfi:een years in jail 
for receiving over U.S. $500,000 in bribes. David Barboza, mM, NCR and Hitachi Named in 
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companies or officers have been prosecuted for paying bribes,220 studies show 
that these scattered enforcement actions have not led to a decrease in perceived 
corruption in China.221 
Similarly, China now has on the books two laws prohibiting overseas com-
mercial bribery. First, China has ratified the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC).222 While UNCAC is an important symbolic gesture, the 
convention has not yet impacted international corporate conduct to a meaningful 
degree due to lack of enforcement.223 Secondly, China has very recendy adopted 
its own FCPA-type law. On February 25, 2011, Chirla amended the above-
mentioned criminal statutes to specifically prohibit the bribing of overseas 
government officials for busilless purposes.224 The most important amendment 
prohibits the giving of "property" to "any foreign public official or official of an 
illternational public organization" for "the purpose of seekillg illegitimate com-
mercial benefit."225 Its jurisdiction, much like the FCPA, extends to all citizens 
wherever located, all natural persons within the territory of China, and all 
companies organized under Chinese law.226 However, the list of countries with 
China Bribe Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/30/business/ 
worldbusiness/30iht-bank.3731302.html. 
220. In the Rio Tinto case, four employees of that British-Australian mining firm were convicted of 
taking bribes of RMB 92,180,000 and stealing commercial secrets. Their sentences ranged from 
seven to fourteen years in prison, substantial personal fines, and confiscation of personal assets. 
ECONOMIC OBSERVER, May 18, 2010, http://www.eeo.com.cn/industry/energy_chem_materialsl 
2010/05/18/170289.shtml. 
221. van Rooij, supra note 217, at 293. 
222. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, arts. 15-16, U.N. Doc. N58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003), 
reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004) [hereinafter UNCAC]. For a complete list of countries that 
have ratified the UNCAC, see United Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. OFFICE 
ON DRUGS &CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unoddenltreaties/CAC/signatories.html (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2011). For background information on the UNCAC, see United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption: Background o/ the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
U.N. 0FF1CE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unoddenltreaties/CAC/ (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2011). 
223. Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Global Achievement or Missed 
Opportunity?, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 191, 224, 228-29 (2005) (stating that lack of robust monitoring 
for the UNCAC means that enforcement will be low and it remains to be seen whether the 
UNCAC is anymore than rhetoric). 
224. Covington & Burling LLP, China Amends Criminal Law to Cover Foreign Bribery (Mar. 1, 2011), 
http://www.cov.com/flles/Publication/42670cdc-69c5-449f-8cca-de977578b090/Presentationl 
PublicationAttachment/ ccc5 6508-172d-44 5a-9a57 -e5 552dedb517 /China%20Amends%20 
Criminal%20Law0Al20to%20Cover%20F oreign%20Bribery. pdf. 
225. LUO, supra note 209, at 97, art. 164. 
226. Covington & Burling LLP, supra note 224. 
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such laws on the books, but without meaningful enforcement, is quite long.227 
Indeed, China has an interest in enforcing domestic prohibitions to project a 
more favorable image and attract foreign direct investment (FDI), while China's 
lack of meaningful overseas bribery prohibitions gives it a great competitive 
advantage. Accordingly, despite China's symbolic efforts, there is little reason 
to doubt that Chinese companies will continue to pay bribes in developing 
countries without fear of penalty. 
2. Human Rights 
China's stance on human rights is, of course, well documented and 
widely recognized.228 It is no surprise, then, that China does not obligate its 
corporations to promote human rights norms in their extraterritorial conduct. 
That China has no analogue to the Alien Tort Statute is unremarkable; the 
ATS is unique to the United States. Less unique to the United States is the prac-
tice of imposing economic sanctions; there, China has a history, but it is brief 
and devoid of a human rights theme. Although China has imposed economic 
sanctions a few times since 1949, they have been few and far between, and 
none were related to human rights. Indeed, since the 1970s China has unilat-
erally imposed sanctions three times: in 1978, against Albania in retaliation for 
anti-Chinese rhetoric; again in 1978, against Vietnam to coerce that country to 
withdraw its troops from Kampuchea; and in 1992, against France to protest 
France's arms sales to Taiwan.229 None were for human rights causes or any 
other social norms unrelated to national security. 
As with Chinese corruption law, various Chinese statutes and constitutional 
provisions purport to prohibit employment discrimination.230 Recently, in 
2007, China passed its most rigorous and employee-friendly statute, the China 
Employment Promotion Law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
227. OECD, Working Group on Bribery: 2010 Data on Enforcement if the Anti-Bribery Con'Vention, Apr. 
2011, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/39/47637707.pdf 
228. See Guo Luoji, A Human Rights Critique if the Chinese Legal System, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 
(1996); Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Wiry the Double Standard?, 38 
CORNELL lNT'L L.J. 71, 84-142 (2005). 
229. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 73, at 25, 30. 
230. Jiefeng Lu, Employment Discrimination in China: The Current Situation and Principle Challenges, 32 
HAMLINE L. REV. 133, 173-78 (2009); see also KENNETH A. CliTSHAW, MICHAEL E. BURKE 
& CHRISTOPHER A. WAGNER, 1 CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN 
CHINA§ 15:11 (3d ed. 2010). 
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ethnicity, race, gender, or religious beliefs (although not age). 231 It specifi-
cally grants victims of discrimination access to courts, thus theoretically 
overcoming the principal obstacle of all previous antidiscrimination provisions in 
China-the lack of enforceability.232 Although a handful of lawsuits have 
resulted,233 it is not widely regarded as a meaningful deterrent to discrimination. 234 
China's income tax regime is one area where the differences with the 
United States may be merely differences of degree, and not of kind. In 1983, 
the government implemented an income taxation scheme to replace the old 
profit-delivery system that had allowed an SOE to keep all profits once it met a 
government set delivery level based on profit, output, quality, variety, and costs. 
This system levies an income tax on SOEs and divides after-tax profits into 
funds that SOEs can retain and funds that are remitted to the state.235 
But despite glimpses of change, China's legal regime remains substantially 
indifferent to the values at the core of the U.S. regime. Meanwhile, China has 
gradually mounted a highly aggressive campaign of outbound foreign direct 
investment. The "Go Global" campaign of the late 1990s, also sometimes trans-
lated as the "Go Out" campaign, has encouraged enterprises to invest abroad.236 
Chinese SOEs are the major players in the nation's increasing outbound 
investment activities.237 Since the launching of the "Go Global" Strategy, Chinese 
companies' interest in overseas investing has increased substantially, especially 
among SOEs. Chinese direct foreign investments rose from $3 billion in 1991 to 
$35 billion in 2003.238 SOEs are deployed in a coordinated manner to maximize 
the benefits to the domestic and foreign affairs policies of the state.239 To guide 
231. Jian Hang & Dean L. Silverberg, China to Allow Employees to Bring Discrimination Suits Agaimt 
Employers, CLIENT ALERTS (Epstein Becker & Green, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 5, 2007, http:// 
www.ebglaw.com/files/17265 _ China%20EmploymentoAl20Promotion%20Client%20Alert.pd£ 
232. Timothy]. Webster, Ambivalence and Activism: Employment Discrimination in China (Aug. 
2010) (unpublished article) (on file with Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository), available at 
h ttp:l I d.igitalcommons.law. yale.edul cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1 OOO&context=ylas. 
233. Id at 57-fJ2. 
234. Id at61-fJ2. 
235. Stevens, supra note 182, at 556. 
236. Larry Cata Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times rf Crisis: Global Regulation rf Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 3, 100--07 (2010); see also Philip C. Saunders, China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, 
and Tools 13-14 (Inst. for Nat'! Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 4, 2006), available at 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/paci£c2006/saunders.pd£ 
237. Catherine (Xiaoying) Zhang, Business Negotiation Between Westerners and Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises, 42 INT'L L. 1303, 1305 (2008). 
238. Backer, supra note 236, at 105. 
239. Id at 104. 
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and assist these companies' investment activities, the Chinese government has 
been actively providing regulatory, enterprise, and diplomatic support.240 The 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce implemented this strategy by issuing, among 
other strategies, the Procedures for the Administration of Overseas Investment, 
which delicately defines the relationship between the government and 
companies seeking outbound investrnents.241 The government's push for the 
development of national industry "champions" is a component of its broader 
political agenda of economic nationalism focused on issues of energy security, 
geopolitical positioning, and national competitiveness.242 Investment is calculated 
to translate into long-term political influence.243 Nations in which China shows 
interest have two things in common: natural resources and the potential for 
new markets.244 
China is thus investing aggressively in developing countries and its 
increasing presence will lead to increasing influence over the formation of those 
countries' legal regimes. As the above analysis shows, Chinese companies are 
bound by a set of laws that are profoundly different from, if not opposed to, 
the laws of progressive capitalism. The following Part begins to explore the 
impact of these respective regimes on developing countries. 
IV. THElMPACfOFPROGRESSIVECAPITALISM 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
This Part attempts to develop an understanding of the significance of the 
contrast between U.S. and China for developing countries. The first Subpart 
identifies the countries in which U.S. international business law has taken 
principal effect-for example, countries where the FCP A is enforced, where 
conduct giving rise to A TS litigation has occurred, or where economic sanctions 
have been targeted. It concludes that these laws take effect overwhelmingly in 
240. Id at 105 n.458. 
241. Id at 105. 
242. Id at 106. 
243. HALPER, supra note 23, at 105. 
244. Id at 106. 
For centuries, [China] has pursued a highly extractive approach towards a 
natural environment which, compared with that of most nations, is extremely 
poorly endowed with resources, most obviously arable land and water, as measured 
by population density. China, for example, has only one-fifth as much water per 
capita as the U.S. 
JACQUES, supra note 26, at 170. 
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developing countries. U.S. international business law is thus, in effect, U.S. 
policy toward developing countries. The first Subpart then details the known 
economic impact of these laws on such countries. Drawing on available empirical 
research, it demonstrates that each area of law tends, whether by design or by 
accident, to decrease FDI in developing countries. For economic sanctions, 
such an outcome is specifically intended and consistent with the laws' clear 
objectives. For the FCPA, by contrast, whether a decrease in FDI is indeed 
consistent with the statute's purpose and likely to achieve its aims is a more 
disputed question. Regardless, the U.S. model of progressive capitalism clearly 
leads to a reduction in FDI in countries whose laws or practices are incon-
sistent with specific U.S. political and social values. The question is not whether 
FDI reduction in developing countries occurs; the question, rather, concerns 
its impact. 
The second Subpart lays a theoretical foundation for addressing this 
question. Drawing on constructive engagement theory, the second Subpart 
lays out the ways in which FDI from more developed nations is understood 
to effectuate reforms in developing countries. This theory, however, fails to 
account for the phenomenon described in this Article-the existence of a 
well-capitalized country that seeks to systematically build economic and polit-
ical alliances with developing countries, but is not itself governed by liberal 
values. To fill this gap in the constructive engagement theory, this Article draws 
on political science and economics literature concerning economic sanctions 
and introduces the concept of the "black knight"-a country that is not partic-
ipating in the sanctions but instead moves in to supply the capital that the 
sanctioning countries have withdrawn. The second Subpart argues that the phe-
nomenon of the black knight is not limited to economic sanctions, but rather 
is now pronounced in international business law in ways that threaten the 
success of the constructive engagement. 
A. Empirical Data: The Enforcement Concentration 
in Developing Countries 
The areas of law included in this study fall into two groups. The first 
category consists of laws that address very specific political and legal conditions 
in particular countries and thus apply to countries only to the extent that those 
countries exhibit the conditions that the law is designed to address. They 
include the FCPA, economic sanctions, and the ATS. Such laws would nat-
urally take effect in countries that egregiously violate human rights or exhibit 
high levels of corruption, and not in countries that do not exhibit these 
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characteristics. The second category includes employment discrimination and 
income tax laws, which are not designed to address particular political condi-
tions overseas and that may ultimately apply to conduct in all countries equally. 
For example, the income tax provisions apply to business conduct in Germany 
in exacdy the same fashion and to the same extent that they apply to conduct in 
the Congo, and there is no reason to believe that taxation laws would be enforced 
any more aggressively or frequendy in either country. 
A quantitative analysis of the countries in which income tax or 
employment law violations have occurred would therefore yield litde fruit. 
Accordingly, the following Subpart focuses on the first category of laws-
those that apply only to particular kinds of regimes and whose enforcement 
will tend to concentrate in particular kinds of countries. As the following 
analysis shows, these laws focus almost exclusively on developing countries. 
This analysis uses the World Bank's classifications of countries based on 
levels of economic development, which divides all187 member nations into three 
groups-low, middle, and high income. The World Bank will sometimes refer to 
low- and middle-income countries collectively as "developing countries," and this 
Article follows that example.245 Each area of law that is principally extraterri-
torial exhibits an overwhelming enforcement focus on developing countries. 
The easiest of these to quantifY is the Alien Tort Statute, owing to its 
comparatively recent resurrection. This Article looks only at cases filed against 
corporations; it disregards cases filed against public officials and private 
individuals. Plaintiffs have filed against corporations for conduct in the fol-
lowing countries: Argentina,246 Bangladesh,247 Burrna,248 China,249 Colombia,250 
245. For a list of these countries and a discussion of the World Bank's methodology, see Country and 
Lending Groups, WORLD BANK, httpJ I data.worldbank.org/about/country-classificationsl country-
and-lending-groups (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). 
246. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 5:04-cv-00194 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 1, 2004). 
24 7. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-07307 (C.D. Cal. flied Oct. 11, 2005). 
248. Doe v. Unocal Corp., No. 2:96-cv-06959 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 3, 1996). 
249. Zheng v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C-08-1068 MMC, 2009 WL 4430297 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2009); 
Xiaoning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 4:07-cv-02151-CW (N.D. Cal. flied Apr. 18, 2007); Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-07307; Kaskyv. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002). 
250. Baloco v. Drummond Co., Inc., No. 09-CV-00557 (N.D. Ala. filed Mar. 20, 2009); In re 
Chiquita Brands Int1, Inc., 08-MD-01916 (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 20, 2008); Shiguago v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., No. 06-04982 (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 10, 2006); Romero v. Drummond Co., 
Inc., No. 03-CV-00575 (N.D. Ala. Filed Apr. 19, 2006), appeal filed, No. 07-14090 (11th Cir. 
2007); Suaraz v. Drummond Co., Inc., No. 03-CV-1788 (N.D. Ala. filed July 11, 2003); Mujica 
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., No. 03-CV-02860 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 24, 2003); Estate of 
Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., Inc., No. 02-CV-0665 (N.D. Ala. flied Mar. 14, 2002); Sinaltrainal 
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Egypt/51 Guatemala,252 lndia,253 lndonesia,254 Liberia,255 Mali/56 Nicaragua,257 
Nigeria/58 the Pacific Island of Saipan/59 Papua New Guinea,260 Peru,261 South 
Africa,262 Swaziland/63 Turkey/64 and Vietnam.265 Each of these countries is 
low- or middle-income. That is, 100 percent of the cases alleging corporate vio-
lations of the ATS have occurred in developing countries. 
The calculation of the impact of economic sanctions requires some minor 
methodological distinctions but yields the same result. As discussed above, the 
use of sanctions by the United States dates back to 1917 but began to focus on 
human rights in the 1970s. This Article includes only those sanctions whose 
declared purpose, as identified by Hufbauer and his colleagues, 266 was to protest 
human rights abuses. The United States has imposed such sanctions against the 
following countries: Argentina (1977), Belarus (2006), Bolivia (1979), Brazil 
(1977), Burma (1988), Cameroon (1992), Chile (1975), China (1989), 
Colombia (1996), Ecuador (2000), El Salvador (1977, 1990), Ethiopia (1977), 
Fiji (2006), Guatemala (1977), Guinea (2002), Haiti (1987, 1991, 2001), 
Ivory Coast (1999), Kenya (1990), Malawi (1992), Nicaragua (1977, 1992), 
Niger (1996), Nigeria (1993), Pakistan (1999), Paraguay (1977), Peru (1991), 
v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 01-CV -3208 (S.D. Fla. filed July 20, 2001); Carijano v. Occidental Corp., 
No. BC370828 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. ftled May 10, 2007). 
251. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 97-CV-02858 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 21, 1997). 
252. Villeda Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., No. 01-CV-3399 (S.D. Fla. illed Aug. 2, 2001). 
253. Bano v. UnionCarbide Corp., No. 99-CV-11329 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 15, 1999). 
254. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-CV-07307; Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-CV-01357 
(D.D.C. flledJune 19, 2001); Kosky, 45 P.3d 243. 
255. F1omo v. Bridgestone Ams. Holding, Inc., No. 05-CV-08168 (C.D. Cal. ftled Nov. 17, 2005), 
transferred to No. 06-CV-00627 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2006). 
256. John Doe I v. Nesde, S.A., No. 05-05133 (C.D. Cal. filed July 14, 2005). 
25 7. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-CV -07307. 
258. Adarnu v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04-CV-01351 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 18, 2004); Bowoto v. Chevron 
Corp., No. 99-CV-02506-SI (N.D. Cal. ftled May 27, 1999); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., No. 96-CV-08386 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 8, 1996). 
259. Doe v. Target Corp., No. 02-CV-80049 (9th Cir. 2009); Does v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. 03-
CV-15252 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2003); Does v. Advanced Textile, No. 99-CV-16713 (9th Cir. July 
28, 1999); Doe v. Brylane, L.P., No. 00-CV-00229 (D. Haw. ftled Mar. 28, 2000); Doe I v. 
Gap., Inc., No. 99-CV-00717 (D. Haw. filed Oct. 15, 1999); Doe I v. Gap Inc., No. 99-CV-
00329 (C.D. Cal. ftledJan. 13, 1999). 
260. Sarei v. Rio Tin to, PLC., No. 00-11695 (C.D. Cal. illed Nov. 2, 2000). 
261. F1ores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., No. 00-CV-9812 (S.D.N.Y. flled Dec. 28, 2000). 
262. In reS. Mrican Apartheid Litig., No. 02-MD-1499 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 20, 2002). 
263. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-CV -07307 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 11, 2005). 
264. Turedi v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 05-CV-09635 (S.D.N.Y. flled Nov. 15, 2005). 
265. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. flled Apr. 20, 1998). 
266. This Article relies on the characterizations of the purposes of each set of sanctions as summarized 
by HOFBAUER ET AL., supra note 73, at 20-33. 
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Poland (1981), Romania (1983), Somalia (1988), South Mrica (1962, 1985), 
South Korea (1973), South Vietnam (1963), Sudan (1989, 2010), Thailand 
(1991), Uganda (1972), Uruguay (1976), Uzbekistan (2005), Zaire (1990), 
Zambia (1996), and Zimbabwe (2002).267 
Each of these countries falls in the low- or middle-income category. As 
with the ATS, this list does not include a single high-income country. This is 
hardly surprising; we all understand that the United States tends not to sanc-
tion countries such as the United Kingdom and France. Still, it bears mention 
in this context that quite literally all of the countries with whom the United States 
has ever ceased business relations to promote human rights in modem history 
have been developing countries. 
Finally, calculating the number of FCPA violations that relate to conduct 
in developing countries is substantially more difficult and requires the following 
analysis. In my previous article, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery 
Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets,268 I compiled a list of 
countries in which alleged acts of bribery formed the basis of either a finding 
of liability in a civil action, a conviction in a criminal action, or a settlement of 
either.269 Because these actions are frequently resolved through pleas, deferred 
prosecution agreements, or civil settlements,270 these instances of alleged bribery 
are not proven. Because the defendant will sometimes settle without admitting 
guilt, these actions are not even admitted violations.271 Rather, these actions are 
allegations of bribery that ultimately formed the basis of the resolution of a 
legal action that fined or penalized the defendant. I will refer to them here as 
"alleged violations." 
267. For sanctions through 1999, see id For sanctions from 2007 to the present, see Sanctiom Programs, 
U.S. DEPT OF TREASURY, http://www.treasUiy.gov/resource-centerlsanctions Programs/Pages/ 
Programs.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). This index does not include cases from the last several 
years in which only certain individuals and organizations of a given country are sanctioned, such as 
Burma or Somalia. 
268. Spalding, supra note 11. 
269. Id at 41G-27. 
270. See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 4 (2d ed. 2005); Lawrence D. Fmder & Ryan D. McConnell, 
Devolution of Authority: The Department of justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1, 1-3 (2006). 
271. See Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, FCPA DIGEST (Shearman & Sterling LLP), Oct. 1, 2009, at 11-218, 
available at http://www.shearman.com/flles/upload!FCPA_Digest.pdf, for a breakdown of 
bribery-related FCPA cases by criminal action, civil action brought by the Department of Justice, 
and civil action brought by the SEC. Bribery-related charges might ultimately be settled either 
under the bribery provisions or the books and records provisions of the FCP A. See id 
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I categorized each country in which an alleged violation occurred over a 
thirty-year period as developing (low- and middle-income) or developed 
(high income).272 In total, 125 alleged violations occurred-that is, 125 sep-
arate instances in which a defendant (or group of defendants) became liable 
for one or more illicit payments in a particular country related to a single 
commercial transaction or a set of closely related transactions. Of these 125 
instances, only nine, or 7 percent of the total, occurred in developed countries. 
Of those nine, only five occurred since ratification of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention in 1997. 
Not surprisingly, very little FCPA enforcement activity occurs in developed 
countries. However, 93 percent of the alleged violations have occurred in devel-
oping countries. FCP A enforcement has concentrated in developing countries 
only marginally less than the ATS and economic sanctions. Accordingly, these 
areas of international business law have an exclusive, or near-exclusive, focus 
on developing countries. 
Intuitively, one would expect the existence of laws attaching severe 
penalties to participating in certain proscribed practices to lead to a reduction 
in investment in countries where those practices are relatively common. 
Empirical research has since confirmed this result for most of the progressive 
capitalism paradigm. Most obvious and foreseeable is the impact of economic 
sanctions. Perhaps less dramatic, but still foreseeable and indeed confirmed by 
empirical studies, is the impact of the FCPA on investment in countries where 
corruption is more prevalent. The ATS has yet to yield sufficient data for such 
studies, though its impact has been the subject of some scholarly predictions. 
The impact that economic sanctions have had to date on target countries 
is perhaps the most easily quantified and least contested. After years of spo-
radic sanctioning, the net costs increased dramatically starting in 1975. That 
year, the total annual costs of sanctions to all target countries was $2.4 billion. 
Five years later, as the Carter administration escalated the use of sanctions, 
particularly for human rights abuses, total annual costs became $6.8 billion. The 
costs of sanctions reached a zenith in the 1990s when annual costs were in 
1990, $28.9 billion, in 1995, $30.8 billion, and in 2000, $27 billion.273 These 
numbers do not differentiate between sanctions for human rights abuses and 
sanctions for other purposes, but nonetheless they give a general sense of the 
272. See Spalding, supra note 11. The categorizations of various countries, and the number of alleged 
violations that occurred in each, are provided in the appendix of my 2010 article. 
273. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 73, at 18. 
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economic effects of sanctions. This data is unsurprising: An economic sanction, 
by design, is a substantial withdrawal of investment from a targeted country. 
Not so with the FCPA, where the potentially negative impact on FDI is 
not self-evident, but has been the subject of two principal empirical studies. In 
1995, not quite twenty years after enactment of the FCPA and three years 
prior to the OECD treaty ratification, James Hines of the John F. Kennedy 
School of Government offered the first major contribution to the theory that 
antibribery legislation deterred investment in countries where bribery is perceived 
to be relatively prevalent.274 Hines analyzed the impact of the FCPA on U.S. 
investment by looking at three indicators of U.S. business activity: foreign 
direct investment,275 capital-to-labor ratios,276 and levels of joint-venture activity 
post-1977.277 Although prior studies had suggested that the FCPA had no meas-
urable impact on foreign investment,279 Hines moved beyond prior scholarship 
by distinguishing the impact of the FCP A from other unrelated factors. He 
found that by each of these measures, U.S. business activity in corrupt countries 
showed "unusual declines" after 1977.28° FDI grew substantially more rapidly 
after 1977 in less corrupt countries than in more corrupt countries, after con-
trolling for GDP growth and total FDJ.281 Similarly, the median capital-to-labor 
ratio for corrupt high-growth countries fell slightly in the years after the FCPA, 
whereas it rose in less corrupt countries.282 With respect to aircraft exports, 
while the U.S. share of the world's exports declined in the years following the 
27 4. James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After 1977 (Nat1 
Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w5266.pdf. 
275. Id. at 6 (reasoning that because the threatened penalties of the FCPA raise the costs of doing 
business in higher risk countries, one possible impact of the FCPA would be a reduction in 
such business). 
276. Id. at 11 (contending that capital-to-labor ratios could be reduced as a result of the FCPA if firms 
conclude that an equally effective alternative to bribing local politicians would be to hire larger 
numbers of their constituents). 
277. Id. at 14. 
278. See, e.g., Paul J. Beck, Michael W. Maher & Adrian E. Tschoegl, The Impact tf the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act on US Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL &DECISION ECON. 295,301 (1991); 
John L. Graham, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A New Perspective, 15 J. INT'L BUS. STIJD. 
107, 107-18 (1984). For Hines's critique of the previous methodologies, see Hines, supra note 
274, at 19 n.23. 
279. Hines, supra note 274, at 2. 
280. Id. at 1. 
281. Id. at 10. 
282. Id. at 12. 
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FCP A, it declined much more significandy, almost four times as much as the 
U.S. share, in corrupt countries relative to less corrupt countries.283 
Hines's analysis of the impact of antibribery legislation on investor 
countries was limited to the United States for the obvious reason that it was the 
only country with such legislation at the time of his study. Once that changed 
with ratification of the OECD convention, a new data set became available, and 
Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, an M.I.T. -trained economist at the Darla Moore School 
of Business at the University of South Carolina, analyzed this data for similar 
trends. In his first article on the subject, Cuervo-Cazurra essentially confirmed 
and expanded upon Hines's thesis.284 His study was narrower than Hines's in 
that he focused exclusively on FDI, but broader in using data on bilateral FDI 
inflows from 183 home economies to 106 host economies with varying quanti-
fied corruption levels.285 
Cuervo-Cazurra found that the phenomenon ofbusinesses from countries 
with antibribery legislation investing less in highly corrupt countries was not 
limited to the United States. Rather, high levels of corruption in a host country 
generally resulted in less FDI from signatories to the OECD convention.286 The 
same phenomenon that Hines identified with respect to the United States thus 
became more widespread as a result of the OECD convention. The underside of 
the phenomenon that Hines first identified-countries that are not bound by 
antibribery legislation continue to invest in corrupt countries-was likewise 
confirmed by Cuervo-Cazurra. After OECD, as signatory countries invested less 
in corrupt countries, countries with higher levels of corruption received relatively 
more FDI from countries with similarly higher corruption levels.287 The result of 
these trends is that as antibribery legislation became more widespread, corrupt 
countries received less of their FDI from less corrupt countries and more of their 
FDI from more corrupt countries.288 
283. Id at 17. 
284. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corrnption?, 37 J INT'L BUS. STUD. 807, 814 (2006). 
Cuervo-Cazurra further noted that Hines's study had become subject to various methodological 
disputes. See Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing Is Corrnption on International Investors?, 82 REV. ECON. 
&STAT. 1 (2000). Cuervo-Cazurra believed that he had improved upon Hines's methodology and 
yet confirmed the results. See Cuervo-Cazurra, supra, at 808-{)9. Again, evaluating these methodol-
ogies is not the purpose of this Article. 
285. Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 284, at 811. 
286. Id at 807-{)8. 
287. Id at 808. 
288. Id. 
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Cuervo-Cazurra further expanded this analysis in a follow-up article 
published in 2008,289 which had two major conclusions concerning the impact 
of antibribery legislation on levels ofFDI in relatively corrupt markets. First, he 
was able to verify and restate the conclusion of his previous article-that 
countries that implemented the OECD convention had become "more 
sensitive" to corruption and had reduced their FDI in more corrupt countries.290 
Second, he proposed a modification of Hines's original thesis. He concluded 
that prior to the OECD convention, U.S. investors were not investing less in 
corrupt countries; U.S. investors began investing less after the ratification of the 
OECD.291 In other words, the FCPA standing alone did not induce U.S. inves-
tors to invest less in corrupt countries, but rather, the OECD induced both 
U.S. and other OECD signatories to invest less. 
This Article needs not consider whether Cuervo-Cazurra's methodology 
is more reliable than Hines's in evaluating the impact of the FCPA prior to 
the OECD convention. The relevant conclusion from these studies is that the 
latest empirical data suggests that antibribery legislation has a deterrent effect 
on investment in countries where bribery is perceived to be more prevalent. 
Moreover, countries that are more tolerant of corruption fill the FDI void. 
The impact of the ATS is perhaps the least certain, as no empirical data 
exists on the impact it may have had since its relatively recent rebirth. However, 
one study has estimated its likely impact. The study found that more than 
180,000 export-related jobs are at risk, reflecting the possible loss of U.S. 
exports. Looking at the impact on U.S. trade and foreign direct investment, it 
estimated a loss of as much as $23 billion in U.S. exports. As much as 25 percent 
of all U.S. oil and mineral imports, amounting to $37 billion, could be dis-
rupted, and U.S. foreign direct investment stocks could decline by over $50 
billion. The countries in which ATS cases have occurred or are likely to occur 
could lose $270 billion of FDI, putting nearly two million jobs at risk, reduc-
ing commerce by $20 billion, and reducing GDP by more than $50 billion.292 
These numbers are, of course, disputed; Koh recommends a much more 
289. Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad, 39 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 
634 (2008). 
290. Id at 644. 
291. Id at 645. 
292. HOFBAUER ET AL., supra note 73, at 38-39. 
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conservative attitude (although does not propose an alternative methodology) 
for estimating ATS impact.293 
Regardless of the exact quantity, there can be no dispute that rigorous 
enforcement of the ATS will tend to diminish U.S. FDI in developing 
countries, much like economic sanctions have always diminished U.S. FDI 
and like, more recently, the FCPA has diminished U.S. FDI. The impact 
that the withdrawal of FDI will have in developing countries today can be 
understood by drawing on two literatures from economics and political science: 
constructive engagement theory and, from economic sanctions, the concept of 
the black knight. 
B. Constructive Engagement Theory and the Problem 
of the Black Knight 
Constructive engagement theory, also known as the developmental 
model, holds that foreign direct investment in developing countries stimulates 
reform.294 Such reforms can occur in any or all of several ways. The first is educa-
tive; as Western companies interact with foreign government officials, private 
companies, and even their own foreign employees, impart liberal values and, 
in reverse, help to integrate those regimes into the global community.295 Com-
panies will also push more forcefully for reforms that at the very least create 
a more favorable business environment, and these tend to also promote other 
related social values.296 The second is reputational; as companies find that their 
economic development hinges on FDI, which in turn hinges on their reputa-
tions as reliable and profitable investment destinations, they will implement 
293. See Koh, supra note 9, at 263-74 (arguing that the detrimental economic effect of ATS litigation 
is overstated). 
294. Herz, supra note 101, at 209. 
295. Jd. at 219-20; see also KARL SCHOENBERGER, LEVI'S CHILDREN: COMING TO TERMS 
WITH HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 112 (2001); Mark B. Baker, 
Flying Over the judicial Hump: A Human Rights Drama Featuring Burma, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, the WTP, and the Federal Courts, 32 LAW & POL'¥ INT'L BUS. 51, 81 (2000) 
(providing a good summary of constructive engagement with citations); Craig Forcese, Globalizing 
Decency: Responsible Engagement in an Era of Economic Integration, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. 
L.J. 1, 5-6 (2002) (same). 
296. Herz, supra note 101, at 221; see also David L. Richards et al., Money With a Mean Streak? Foreign 
Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries, 45 
INT'L STUD. Q219, 222,235 (2001). 
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appropriate reforms that generally include political liberalization.297 Third, 
foreign investment can stimulate the growth of a middle class that will agitate for 
political freedoms.298 
The literature is founded on two critical, and now uncertain, premises. 
The first is that capital-exporting nations have more progressive legal regimes 
than the developing countries in which they operate. Thus, the capital-rich 
countries can help to liberalize the countries whose legal systems are still 
transitional. The second premise is that the companies from these countries 
have a powerful tool at their disposal: the threat of withdrawing FDI. Com-
panies can demand reforms in developing countries for the very reason that 
the developing country wants and needs the capital. The supply of capital is the 
incentive that these companies can offer; the withdrawal of capital is the threat 
that they can leverage to achieve the needed reforms. 
While these two premises may have been largely true in the past, this 
Article claims that they are not true today. Today, China is the best, though 
not the only, example of a capital-rich country with an aggressive foreign policy, 
but with an alternative legal regime. If a company bound by the legal obli-
gations of progressive capitalism withdraws its FDI, Chinese companies can 
move in and fill the void. The leverage that U.S. companies have historically 
held is being undermined by the rise of China. While the legal literature has yet 
to acknowledge and come to terms with this fact, literature from the fields of 
political science and economics can fill in our understanding significantly. 
Economic sanctions, a subject of abundant political science and economics 
scholarship, have historically often failed due to the phenomenon of the black 
knight.299 These are powerful wealthy allies of the target country that move in 
to fill the void that the sanctions create. This dynamic plays out most powerfully 
when large powers are engaged in ideological struggles and are competing for 
influence in transitional countries, as illustrated in U.S. sanctions against Cuba 
and Nicaragua in which the Soviet Union played the black knight, or in Soviet 
sanctions against Yugoslavia and Albania, in which the United States played 
the black knight.300 In the post-Cold War world, black knights-led by 
China-have opposed U.S. sanctions efforts with significant effect in Iran and 
297. Herz, supra note 101, at 220-21; see also WESLEY T. MILNER, ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 
AND RIGHTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, in GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 77, 80, 
88 (Alison Brysk ed., 2002). 
298. Herz, supra note 101, at 221; see also Forcese, supra note 295, at 10-17. 
299. See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 73, at 8. 
300. Id. 
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Burma.301 An example with very different ideological fault lines is the Arab 
boycott of Israel, in which the United States was the black knight.302 For the 
target of sanctions, accepting the support of a black knight is frequently the rela-
tively easier and more economical way to avoid the harmful effects of the 
sanctions.303 The black knight phenomenon has proven historically to be less 
effective when the sanctioning countries already have something of a political 
alliance with each other, whereas the effect is especially pronounced when the 
sender lacks a strong relationship with the target.304 The duration of a sanctions 
episode also correlates with the presence of black knights. When such countries 
intervene, the sanctions are of course less effective and the sender country will 
therefore extend the sanctions far longer than if no black knights existed. 
Historically, sanctions with black knights have lasted roughly twice as long as 
sanctions without them.305 The assistance of black knights "erodes the chances 
of success and, given the reluctance of most senders to admit failure and lift 
sanctions, contributes to episodes that drag on indefinitely."306 Put another way, 
"too many cooks opposing sanctions can spoil the sender's broth."307 Moreover, 
the presence of black knights tends to "bolster the target government's standing 
at home and abroad."308 
This black knight phenomenon is likewise visible, with alarming inten-
sity, in the anticorruption context. Hines noted that while U.S. commercial 
engagement in corrupt countries dropped significantly as a result of the FCP A, 
no evidence exists to suggest that total foreign business activity in such countries 
dropped; other firms that were not constrained by antibribery legislation appar-
ently took the place once occupied by U.S. companies.309 He noted that the 
principal effect of the statute was to divert U.S. investments to less corrupt 
countries, and in more corrupt countries, to effectively "encourag[e] ownership 
substitution between [U.S.] and foreign investors."31° Cuervo-Cazurra predicted 
that corruption-prone countries would increasingly turn to companies from 
301. Id. at 175. 
302. Id. at 8. 
303. Id. at 47. 
304. Id. at 163. 
305. Id. at 172. 
306. I d. 
307. Id. at 175. 
308. I d. 
309. Id. at 38-39. 
310. Hines, supra note 274, at 19. 
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countries without effective anticorruption measures to replace the capital that 
the United States and its allies become uncomfortable providing. 
As noted above, the OECD311 has adopted a convention312 that calls on 
member nations to enact legislation that very closely resembles the FCPA.313 
All OECD member states, and several other nations, have enacted such 
legislation. While supporters of the convention hail it as the solution to global 
corruption,314 two reasons counsel caution, one of which is temporary and the 
other which is potentially permanent. The temporary reason is that no other 
OECD nation has come even remotely close to enforcing its statute to the extent 
that the United States enforces the FCPA. Statistics on the volume of anticor-
ruption enforcement actions from other countries show that the amount of 
anticorruption enforcement actions in these countries remains astonishingly 
low.315 To be optimistic, though, countries such as Germany and the United 
Kingdom are beginning to follow the United States's lead and will likely continue 
to do so; it may well be simply a matter of time before most of the major capital 
exporters in the OECD meaningfully enforce their FCPA-type statutes. 
But the second, potentially permanent problem will prove trickier. When 
the OECD adopted its convention in 1997, the convention's ranks included 
virtually all significant exporters of capital in the world. Since 1997, however, 
the world has changed in dramatic and irreversible ways. Most notable has 
been the emergence of the BRlC, an acronym coined by Goldman Sachs to 
describe the four biggest emerging markets-Brazil, Russia, India, and China. 
311. For a brief overview of the OECD, see About the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD ), 0 ECD, http:/ /www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36 734052_36 734103 _ 
1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2010); see also George eta!., supra note 79, at 485-86; 
James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, 68 LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 190-217 (2005) (detailing the history and 
structure of the OECD while also providing several case studies). 
312. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, reprinted in 37 l.L.M. 1 (1998), available 
at http:/ /www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/ 4/18/38028044.pdf. 
313. The OECD convention resembles the FCPA. See George eta!., supra note 79, at 501-12. In 
1998, the FCPA was amended to more closely resemble the OECD convention. See The FCPA 
Explained, FCP A ENFORCEMENT, http:/ /www.fcpaenforcement.com/explained/ explained. asp 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
314. See, e.g., George eta!., supra note 79, at 523-24; Anne Janet DeAses, Note, Developing Countries: 
Increasing Tramparency and Other Methods of Eliminating Corruption in the Public Procurement 
Process, 34 PuB. CONT. L.]. 553, 570-71 (2005). 
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In 1997 these four countries were not yet described as ERIC and exported little 
capital; they were instead regarded as promising investment destinations--as 
importers of capital but not exporters. This has changed as these countries 
increasingly export capital and otherwise command increasing influence in 
major global financial institutions. 
None of the ERIC nations is a member of the OECD. The organization 
has nonetheless actively lobbied each of these countries to enact FCP A-type 
legislation. India has notably declined.316 While Brazil,317 China,318 and Russia319 
have enacted such laws, the list of countries that have done the same but have 
taken absolutely no enforcement action is quite lengthy. China thus stands to 
remain a black knight in international business for the foreseeable future. 
The following Conclusion begins to wrestle with this difficult fact. 
CONCLUSION: AVOIDING A RACE TO THE BOTTOM 
On the broad spectrum of economic ideology-a radical commitment to 
small government and economic liberty lying at one pole, and the dominant state 
presence of twentieth century communism lying at the other-the United 
States and China originally occupied either extreme. At their respective revo-
lutions, the United States embodied the principles of natural rights and limited 
government,320 while China sought to build a Soviet-style planned economy.321 
But for each country, a series of political and economic crises drew it away from 
the extremes and toward the center. In the United States, the Civil War, the 
Great Depression, the Civil Rights Movement, Watergate, and the accounting 
scandals of the 1990s successively enlarged the power of the federal government 
316. For OECD activity with these and other countries, see OECD Enlargement, OECD, http:// 
www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3343,en_2649 _34487 _38598698_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Oct. 
17,2011). 
317. C. C. Law No. 10.467 (Br); C.P. Law No. 9.613 (Br). For more information on the antibribery 
legislation in Brazil, see Brazii-OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/26/0,3746,en_2649 _37447 _ 44571034_1_1_1_37447,00.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
318. LUO, supra note 209. 
319. See OECD Welcomes Russia Introducing Law to Make Foreign Bribery a Crime, OECD, http:// 
www.oecd.org/document/36/0,3746,en_21571361_ 44315115_ 47769508_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
320. See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's 
Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. &POL. 63 (1987); Patrick M. Garry, Liberty Through Limits: The Bill of 
Rights as Limited Government, 62 SMU L. REv. 1745 (2009); Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a 
Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263 (2005). 
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and expanded the federal regulation of commercial affairs. On the opposite side 
of the spectrum, and the globe, China experienced economic stagnation, the 
failed economic reforms of the Great Leap Forward, the atrocities of the Cultural 
Revolution, and, finally, the death of Mao. 322 China then promoted economic 
development by limiting the government's role in economic regulation, while 
the role of the U.S. federal government was expanding. 
Today, in the sphere of international business, these two nations have 
not just met in the middle of that ideological spectrum; rather, they have passed 
each other. With respect to the areas of business law described in this Article, 
the United States now stands for the aggressive use of the state's coercive 
power to direct corporate conduct toward social goals that are not narrowly 
related to the market. Meanwhile, China has sought to reduce such restraints 
in the name of maximizing economic growth to forestall social unrest and to 
preserve the Communist Party's power. In the United States, the liberal ideals 
of Adam Smith and Thomas Jefferson323 were supplanted by administrations of 
two Roosevelts324 and Jimmy Carter;325 while the revolutionary communalism 
of Marx, Lenin, and Mao were displaced in China by the pragmatic reforms of 
Deng Xiaopin~26 and his successors. Hence the irony of international business 
law: While U.S. law now obligates corporations to pursue the social goals of 
combating corruption and promoting human rights, the Chinese legal regime 
permits and even encourages profit-seeking with scant regard for social impact. 
322. See, e.g., RODERICK MACFARQUHAR &JOHN K. FAIRBANK, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
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But the irony of international business law has an additional dimension. 
As Part IV demonstrates,327 as the United States enforces progressive capi-
talism with the threat of severe penalty, U.S. companies inevitably invest less 
in countries whose practices are most inconsistent with progressive values. 
Sometimes, these companies will consciously accept the risk, move forward with 
business plans, potentially aspire to push for reforms, and certainly hope to 
avoid entanglement in prohibited business practices. But as both empirical 
literature and common sense would confirm, some companies will deem the 
risk too great and decline to invest. Companies from countries that lack such 
prohibitions then fill this FDI void. As identified by the theoretical resources 
of the economics and political science literature discussed above,328 the emer-
gence of a powerful black knight thus thwarts the constructive engagement 
enterprise. Accordingly, the over-aggressive enforcement of prohibitions on cor-
ruption and of human rights violations can foster the very conditions in which 
these practices thrive. 
Imagine, then, another spectrum, representing the range of approaches 
to the enforcement of U.S. international business law. At one end lies the 
most severe enforcement regime, designed to incentivize maximum compliance 
with progressive values. At the other end of this spectrum lies an utterly lax 
enforcement regime with minimal deterrent value. From the perspective of the 
United States, these extremes are, of course, significantly different in practice: 
They make the difference between socially responsible and irresponsible conduct. 
However, from the perspective of the developing countries in which these 
businesses operate, the two extremes of the enforcement spectrum actually 
produce substantially similar results. When U.S. enforcement becomes so 
severe that U.S. companies can no longer afford the risk of doing business in 
developing countries, their withdrawal creates a void that Chinese companies can 
exploit. Because Chinese companies are not bound by such restrictive laws as 
in the United States, they behave just as U.S. companies would have if the laws 
of U.S. progressivism had not been enforced at all. On either side of the spec-
trum, the developing country is left to be ravaged by socially irresponsible 
business conduct. 
The solution to the problem outlined in this Article lies in striking the 
delicate balance between enforcing progressive norms and enabling constructive 
engagement. The cynic may immediately retort that any talk of "balance" 
327. See supra Part IV.B. 
328. See supra Part IV.B. 
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merely speeds the race to the bottom. Not so. The law must continue to 
punish bribery and complicity in human rights abuses, but it must do so in a 
manner that further encourages, rather than deters, investment in developing 
countries. Conversely, the law can neither let egregious corporate misconduct 
go unpunished, nor leave developing countries vulnerable to the predatory 
practices of companies that lie outside U.S. jurisdiction. How this might be 
achieved is a question that holds extraordinarily rich promise for future theoret-
ical, doctrinal, and empirical research. 
